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I.

INTRODUCTION

The exhaustion of rights doctrine is one of the most fundamental
limitations on intellectual property rights. It provides, in general
terms, that when an intellectual property right holder sells an article
embodying those rights, they are exhausted with respect to that article.1 Thus, a purchaser can resell the article without being liable for
infringement. The exhaustion of rights doctrine takes on its greatest
significance when goods embodying intellectual property rights are
traded internationally.
When rights are held in multiple nations for the same piece of
intellectual property, the question arises whether, and which of, these
rights are exhausted by sale of the article.2 If all rights are exhausted,
intellectual property right holders will be frustrated in their attempts
to maintain differential pricing schemes across nations; if they are
not, then free trade in previously-sold goods may be stopped internationally for goods which could freely circulate within a nation. Indeed, some courts even suggest that goods sold in a nation which are
exported cannot be reimported without infringing.3 When goods are
traded in contravention of the marketing scheme of the intellectual
property right holder (or its licensee), they are called as "gray market" goods or "parallel imports." 4 Thus there is an inextricable link
between parallel imports and the exhaustion of rights: whether goods
property
can be parallel imported depends on whether the intellectual
5
rights they embody were exhausted by previous sales.
Ordinarily, a party with authorization from the right holder to
sell the product in the region objects to parallel importation when the
unauthorized party markets the parallel imports at a lower price. The
unauthorized party is able to offer the same product at this lower
price because the product is available in some other country at a
1. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988) (exhaustion of distribution right of copyright).
See also infra Parts II-IV (describing exhaustion ofrights law).
2.

Inherent in patent, trademark, and copyright protection is the right to prevent in-

fringing imports. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988) (trademark); 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1988)
(copyright); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (West Supp. 1996) (patent). Typically, right holders use this
protection against "pirated" copies, but the protection may also be effective to prevent the
importation of genuine goods.

3. See infra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing L 'Anza case).
4. See generally K mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281 (1988) (defining gray market
goods in trademark context).
5. See infra Parts II-IV. In the international arena, which is the subject of this comment, issues surrounding parallel trade and exhaustion of rights are essentially the same issue.

The terms are used interchangeably unless the context lends itself to one term or the other.
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lower price.6 The reasons such price discrepancies arise has been the
subject of considerable debate, and generalizations, across time,
trading areas, and intellectual property rights, are most likely inappropriate.7
In precisely what instances right holders may use intellectual
property law against parallel imports has been the subject of much
litigation,' both in the United States9 and abroad.10 The considerable
economic stakes of the gray market has also prompted economic
analyses of the parallel importation. 1 As a trade-related aspect of
intellectual property, one might suspect that international initiatives
to harmonize intellectual property rights would have harmonized the
law of the exhaustion of rights. The contrary is, in fact, the case.
This has resulted in markedly different regimes in the United States
and its major trading partners. 2 Moreover, U.S. law on exhaustion of
rights is itself widely disparate across patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
As the law has diverged, it has ignored the economic insights an
analysis of the exhaustion of rights problem provides. As trading and
intellectual property regimes converge, the law of parallel imports
must harmonize.' 3 This comment reveals, however, that exhaustion
of rights regimes are diverging. It is the position of this comment
that deliberate attempts at harmonization should begin, lest reliance
on divergent regimes prove an insurmountable hurdle to harmonization. The significant effects parallel import law has on the welfare of
consumers and producers around the world evince this need.
This comment first describes the exhaustion of rights law in the
United States, Europe, and Japan. The need for harmonization revealed by these nation's laws is then analyzed in more detail. The
economics of parallel trade are examined and suggestions for the appropriate type of harmonization made.
6. See, e.g., supra note 174 and accompanying text (describing European cases involving parallel trade in pharmaceuticals).

7. The three most common reasons commentators cite as the basis for international
price discrepancies are: differences in costs of marketing and after sales support; currency
fluctuations; and deliberate price discrimination by a firm with market power. David A.
Maleug & Marion Schwartz, ParallelImports, Demand Dispersion, and InternationalPrice
Discrimination.,37 J. Irr'LEcoN. 167, 172-174 (1994).

8. See infra Parts II-IV.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Parts III and IV.
11. See infra Part V.

12. See infra Part VI.
13.

See infra Part VII.
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First, however, further explanation of a key concept is in order.
As noted, the doctrine of exhaustion of rights provides that the sale of
an article embodying intellectual property rights ("IPRs") exhausts
those rights with respect to that article. 4 A related, but distinct, concept is that of the territoriality of IPRs. The notion here is that intellectual property rights are limited to the territory of the nation granting them." For example, under this doctrine, trademark rights in
Canada could not block imports into the United States.
The two concepts are closely related, though. Whether a right
holder has exhausted her IPR may depend on whether those rights
were territorial or universal. For example, if rights under a Japanese
patent were not territorial, then sale of an article embodying the underlying invention would exhaust the Japanese rights even if the sale
were in another nation. 6 Conversely, if U.S. copyrights were territorial, then sale of a copy of a copyrighted work by a U.S. copyright
holder outside the United States would not exhaust the U.S. copy17

rights.

IX. EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS UNDER U. S. LAW

The primary laws controlling parallel imports into the United
States are the federal intellectual property laws, 8 although state law
may also regulate the area.' 9 As the following sections illustrate,
14. See, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
15. See, e.g., Person's Co., Ltd. v. Catherine Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
16. See infra Part IV (describing Japanese parallel import law).
17. See infra Part II.C (describing U.S. parallel import law under copyright).
18. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (West 1996), Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011101 (West, 1996), Lanham Trade-mark Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1996).
19. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1797.81(a) (West 1992):
Every retail seller who offers grey market goods for sale shall post a conspicuous sign at the product's point of display and affix to the product or its package
a conspicuous ticket, label, or tag disclosing any or all of the following, whichever is applicable:
(1) The item is not covered by a manufacturer's express written warranty
valid in the United States (however, any implied warranty provided by
law still exists).
(2) The item is not compatible with United States electrical currents.
(3) The item is not compatible with United States broadcast frequencies.
(4) Replacement parts are not available through the manufacturer's
United States distributors.
(5) Compatible accessories are not available through the manufacturer's
United States distributors.
(6) The item is not accompanied by instructions in English.
(7) The item is not eligible for a manufacturer's rebate.
(8) Any other incompatibility or nonconformity with relevant domestic
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there is little uniformity across the federal intellectual property laws
with respect to parallel imports.
A. Exhaustion of U.S. PatentRights
Section 271 of the Patent Act provides that, "whoever without
authority... offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."
This section would appear to proscribe all parallel imports as, by hypothesis, "without authority." However, it is constrained by the exhaustion of rights principle, which provides that the first lawful sale
effectively exhausts the patentee's rights.2' Thus, when there has
been a lawful sale of the patented article which exhausts the patentee's rights,' the patentee, or their licensee, is without recourse

against subsequent parallel imports of that article.
When a U.S. patentee holds patents for the same invention in
several nations ("parallel patents") unauthorized first sales under foreign patents do not exhaust U.S. patent rights. In Boesch v. Graff'2 a
third party manufactured lamp burners in Germany which infringed a

U.S. patent.24 The U.S. patentee, Graff, held a parallel patent in
Germany. Under German law of the time, the sale and manufacture
of the burners were lawful because they occurred prior to Graff's

standards known to the seller.
20. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West Supp. 1996). Section 271 also bars importation of products made by processes patented within the United States (§ 271(g)) as well as certain components for practicing a patented invention or process. § 271 (c).
21. The right to import was added by a 1994 law, effective January 1, 1996. See 35
U.S.C.A. § 271 (West Supp. 1997) (tracing amendments). There is no reason to believe that
this right would be any less subject to exhaustion than the others. See United States v. Univis
Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241 (1942). In Univis Lens, the holder of a patent on eyeglass lenses
licensed the patent to another to manufacture the blanks and sell them to licensed wholesalers,
finishing retailers and prescription retailers. Id. at 243. As part of a system of resale price
maintenance, the licenses contained restrictions on the ability of the wholesalers and lensfinishing retailers to sell the processed lens blanks. Id. at 244-45. The Supreme Court held
such restrictions illegal because the patentee had reaped the benefits which the patent conferred him with the first sale. Id. at 251-52. "[The patentee's] monopoly remains so long as he
retains the ownership of the patented article. But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that the
article and the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent control the use or disposition
of the article." Id. at 250.
22. The qualification of a sale that exhausts the patentee's rights is important here.
Whether a sale exhausts the rights of the party trying to block the parallel import depends on
who made it and where it was made. See also infra Part II.C (discussing relevance of location
of sale under copyright law).
23. 133 U.S. 697 (1890).
24. Id. at 699.
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The Court held that Boesch infringed the U.S.

26
patent by importing the burners into the United States.

While Boesch held that lawful sales abroad by one unrelated to
the patentee did not exhaust U.S. patent rights, how closely tied to its
particular facts this holding is remains unclear. Holiday v. Matthe-

son,27 a lower court case decided five years earlier, held that authorized sales abroad without prohibitions on reimportation exhausted
U.S. patent rights. 28 In Holiday, the plaintiff (owner of the U.S. patent) sold the patented article in England, where it was acquired by the

defendant. 29 The court held the sale abroad exhausted all of plaintiffs patent rights around the world.30 The Court in Boesch made no
mention of Holiday and subsequent courts have not agreed on the
reach of its holding after Boesch.
In CurtissAeroplane 1 the U.S. patentee authorized the British
25. Id. at 701-702.
26. "The right which (the German producer] had to make and sell the bumers in
Germany was allowed him under the laws of that county, and purchasers
from him could not be thereby authorized to sell the articles in the United
States in defiance of the rights of patentees under a Unites States patent." Id.
at 703 (emphasis added).
27. 24 F. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
28. Holiday, 24 F. at 185-86. See generally Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453
(1873) (where patentee transferred exclusive right to make, use, or sell patented article within a
an area around Boston to one party and the remaining rights to plaintiff, plaintiff could not bar
use of patented article in his territory by those who acquired the article from in Boston from
authorized seller "[W]hen the patentee, or the person having his rights sells a machine or
instrument whose sole value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its uses and he parts
with the right to restrict that use. The article... passes without the limit of the monopoly").
See also Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549-50 (1852) ("'he purchaser of
the implement or machine for the purpose of using it in the ordinary pursuits of
life ... exercises no rights created by the act of Congress .... When the machine passes to the
hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside of
it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of Congress .... The implement or machine
becomes his private, individual property, not protected by the laws of the United States, but by
the laws of the State in which it is situated.").
29. Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
30. Id. It was immaterial to the court that the sale occurred abroad:
The presumption arising from such a sale [without restrictions] is that the vendor intends to part with all his rights in the thing sold, and that the purchaser is
to acquire an unqualified property right in it; and it would be inconsistent with
the presumed understanding of the parties to permit the vendor to retain the
power of restricting the purchaser to using the thing bought in a particular way,
or in a particular place.
Id.
The doctrine that a IP right holder's first sale exhausts all parallel rights around the world is
known as "international exhaustion."
31. Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266 F. 71 (2d Cir.
1920).
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government to practice its patents on airplanes and motors without
restriction. 2 A Canadian company was set up to manufacture the
planes during World War I, and the defendant purchased the planes
after the war for sale in the United States.3 3 The court made clear the
international exhaustion principle:
If a patentee or his assignee sells a patented article, that article is
freed from the monopoly of any patents which the vendor may
possess. If the thing sold contains inventions of several United
States patents owned by the vendor, the article is freed from each
and all of them; and if the vendor has divided his monopoly into
different territorial monopolies, his sale frees the article from them
all. If a vendor's patent monopoly consists of foreign and domestic patents, the sale frees the article from the monopoly of both his
foreign and his domestic patents. 34
Other courts have reached a different conclusion and ruled that
when parallel patents are held in the United States and abroad, sales
under the foreign patents will not exhaust U.S. patent rights. 35 In
Griffin, the plaintiff held parallel patents on machinery in the United
States and Italy.36 Defendant acquired the patented machine from the
exclusive Italian licensee 37 and sought to reimport them into the
United States. 38 Finding Boesch controlling and stressing the territoriality of patents, the court rejected adopting the international exhaustion rationale: "We are not persuaded by the defendant's logic,
however, and we find no authority supporting the position, that the
identity of the plaintiff as the patentee in both the United States and
Italy justified a departure from the Boesch rule." 39

32. Id. at 72-73.
33. Id. at 74-75.
34. Id. at 78.
35. Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
36. Id. at 1283.

37. The licensee also had the exclusive right to sell the patented item within the European Economic Community. Id. at 1284. Under European Union law, parallel importation
into other Member States could not have been prevented had the patentee held patents in those
States as well. See infra Part 11I.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 1285. The Griffin court makes no mention of Curtiss Aeroplane and it does
not appear that the defendant made any argument based on applying the principle in the text

quoted at note 34. The court did, however, look to DaimlerMfg.Co. v. Conklin, 170 F. 70 (2d
Cir. 1909), a case in which the U.S. assignee of patent rights from a German inventor succeeded against a consumer who purchased a car embodying the patented inventions made in
Germany with the authorization of the inventor and returned it to the United States. Griffin,
453 F. Supp. at 1285.
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A case from the pharmaceutical industry4° clarifies the rights of
licensees." The French pharmaceutical concern Sanofi, held the U.S.

patent for the drug acerpromazine maleate, which was authorized
only for veterinary use in the United States. 42 Sanofi sold the product
in Europe, the defendant later acquired it and resold it in the United

States.43 Sanofi, and its exclusive U.S. licensee, American Home,

brought suit." With respect to Sanofi, the court followed the rule of
Holiday v. Mattheson.45 It distinguished Boesch on grounds that

there, neither the patentee nor one authorized by it, made the sale
abroad," and distinguished Griffin on the grounds that Sanofi made
the sale itself without restrictions on import into the United States.4 7
The court held that Sanofi, having sold the product in Europe with

the intent to part with all rights it had in the product, could not enjoin
the imports."

However, the exclusive U.S. licensee's rights were not exhausted by the sale and could enjoin the imports.49 According to the

court, Sanofi could not sell in the United States, having granted the
exclusive license, and the purchasers in Europe therefore took the

product subject to the outstanding U.S. license. The court rejected
application of Univis Lens because the sale was not one which could
40. Pharmaceuticals are a common source of exhaustion of rights litigation. Because of
the costly approval process in many nations, the significant market power conferred by many
pharmaceutical patents, and the fact that in some nations, no patent protection may be provided at all for certain pharmaceuticals, there are frequently wide price disparities across national borders for pharmaceuticals. See infra Parts III.C-D. (discussing European cases involving pharmaceuticals). This market imperfection is corrected by the transnational arbitrage

of the parallel importer.
41. Sanofi, S.A. v. Med. Tech Veterinarian Prod., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931 (D.N.J. 1983).
But see infra note 109 and accompanying text (copyright case holding only owner of copyright
can object to parallel imports under U.S. law).
42. Id. at 934.
43. Id. at 935.
44. Id. at 934.
45. Id. at 938.
46. Sanofi, S.A. v. Med. Tech Veterinarian Prod., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 938 (D. N.J.
1983).
47. Griffin too is distinguishable from this situation because here the sale abroad
was made by the patent holder itself without restriction. This distinction is of
crucial significance. In this case, were the purchaser to search the patent records in the United States, it would find that the holder of the patent is the very
party which made the sale without restriction .... [A]ssuming Sanofi had a
right to enjoin the reselling of the goods in this country, it waived that right
by not placing any written restrictions upon the purchaser at the time of sale.
Id.
48. Id. at 938.
49. Id. at 941.

COMPUTER & IHGHTECINOLOGYL4WJOURATAL [Vol. 13

454

have been made in the United States lawfully: "If the court were to
hold that Sanofi's sale of the product exhausted the patent it would be
crediting Sanofi with greater rights than the patentee actually had.""0
In summary, the holding in Boesch has not been broadly interpreted. There is disagreement among the courts whether sales abroad
authorized by a U.S. patentee exhaust U.S. patent rights. Ordinarily,
when the sales are not with the patentee's authorization, the U.S.
rights are not exhausted.
B. Exhaustion of U.S. TrademarkRights
Two sources of law may protect U.S. trademark rights after a
first sale. Section 42 of the Lanham Act provides:
[N]o article of imported merchandise, which shall copy or simulate
the name of the any [sic] domestic manufacture, or manufacturer... which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in
accordance with the provisions of [the Lanham Act] ...
shall be
admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States."
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the U.S. any merchandise of
foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print,
package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trade-mark owned by a
citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized
within, the U.S., and registered in the Patent Office.52
Section 526 was enacted to overcome the Court of Appeals decision in Bourjois v. Katzel. 3 In Katzel, a French cosmetic concern
sold its U.S. trademark, goodwill, and business to the plaintiff.54 The
defendant purchased powder from the French concern overseas and
reimported it into the United States under a similar mark.5 5 The Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, held, per Holmes, J.,
that this infringed plaintiff's trademark:
It is said that the trade mark here is that of the French house and
truly indicates the origin of the goods. But that is not accurate. It
is the trademark of the plaintiff only in the U.S. and indicates in
50. Id. at 941.

51. 15U.S.C.§ 1124 (1988).
52.

19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1988).

53. A. Boujois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921) rev'd, 260 U.S. 689
(1923). See JEROME GmsoN, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 4.05[5] (1996) [hereinafter
GsoN].

54. A. Bouijois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 690.
55. Id. at 691.
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law, and, it is found, by public understanding, that the goods come
from the plaintiff although not made by it.6

The Supreme Court's holding in Katzel established the territoriality of trademarks, that is, they are of legal force only within the
reach of the laws of the right-granting state. 7 As a purely doctrinal
matter, under this principal, trademark rights throughout the reach of
U.S. would be exhausted by sales within this reach, but nowhere else.
Exhaustion of U.S. trademark rights is more complicated. The Supreme Court has limited Katzel by interpreting it as a case when a
defendant sought to market goods "of one make under the trade name
of another."58 Circuit courts have also interpreted it narrowly, 9 and
the regulations enacted in the wake of lower court opinion in Katzel
do not always provide clear guidance.
The regulations enacted pursuant to § 52660 were the subject of
K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.6 The Court found that gray market
goods arose in three different contexts.62 Case 1 was where a foreign
firm sold to an independent U.S. entity the rights to register and use
the foreign firm's trademark in the United States only later to import
and distribute goods in the United States.63 This was the scenario in
Katzel, and the Court in K martheld that barring the imports was legitimate.' A contrary ruling would work an injustice on the holder
of the mark in the United States who had invested in developing the
trademark.65 Case 2 was where the U.S. trademark for goods manu56. Id at 692.
57. GnsoN, supra note 52, § 4.05[5]. Note how this situation parallels that of Boesch
discussed supra Part II.A.
58. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 128 (1947).

59. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1986) (limiting
Katzel to its "special facts"); NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, Inc., 810 F.2d 1506, 1510 (9th
Cir.1987) (limiting application of Katzel to cases with the same equities as Katzel).
60. The regulations at issue were enacted by the customs service in 1972. They allowed
parallel imports where:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the
same person or business entity, or
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name are owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control;
or

(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name
applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,288 n.2 (1988) (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)).
61.

486 U.S. 281 (1988).

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 286.
Id.
Id. at 292.
K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,292-93 (1988)
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factured abroad is registered by a domestic firm that is either (a) a
subsidiary of the foreign manufacturer, (b) the parent of the foreign
manufacturer, or (c) the same as the foreign manufacturer. 66 The
Court 67 upheld the regulations in this case, thus allowing parallel imports when the foreign and domestic entities were under "common
control. 68 Case 3 was where the allegedly infringing imports bore a
registered U.S. trademark and were manufactured by an independent
foreign entity under the authorization of the U.S. mark holder. 69 This
situation typically arose when a U.S. entity owned the same mark in
the United States and in foreign countries and licensed use of the
mark to a foreign manufacturer in the foreign countries. 0 Under the
Customs Regulations, these goods could not be stopped from entering the United States, 71 and the Supreme Court struck down the
regulations as inconsistent with the plain language of § 526.72 Thus,
where the foreign entity is not under common control with the U.S.
mark holder, sales by a licensee of the U.S. mark owner do not exhaust the U.S. rights under § 526. 73 The Supreme Court left considerable room for parallel trade to continue under § 526. However, the
Supreme Court was only addressing the validity of the Customs
regulations in K mart, and it was left to later cases to specify
when § 42 of the Lanham Act provided other rights.
Subsequent case law has established the rule that otherwise legal
parallel imports cannot be stopped unless they are "materially different" from those authorized to be sold in the United States. 74 The
66. I.e., the situation envisioned under part 2 of the customs service regulations in supra
note 60.

67. The Court split on case 2, with the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor,
and Scalia dissenting. K mart,486 U.S. at 309-10.

68.

This is frequently referred to as the "common control exception." For a good illus-

tration, see Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
69. K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,294 (1988).

70.

GiLsoN, supra note 52, § 4.05[6].

71.

See supra note 60.

72. Kmart,486 U.S. at 294,328-29.
73. Justices Brennan, Marshall, White and Stevens dissented from this holding. Id. at
295.
74.

See generally El Greco Leather Prods. Co., v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392 (2d

Cir. 1986) (leather shoes not subject to inspection procedures were not "genuine" because
inspection played integral role in plaintiff's quality management); Mavic Inc. v. Sinclair Imports, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 202 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (price, warranty and packaging differences

not material for bicycle components, injunction ordered that parallel goods have adapters
placed on them to conform to genuine goods rather then block importation entirely); Grupo
Gamesa S.A. De C.V. v. Dulceria El Molino, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1531 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (cookies and crackers materially different where different marketing and quality control

procedures followed, gray goods did not indicate that U.S. licensee owned U.S. mark, enriched
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courts confronting the issue revert to the fundamental trademark in-

fringement analysis of likelihood of confusion.'

However, in this

context, consumers are likely to be confused whenever there are

"material differences" between the genuine and gray goods. In Societe des ProduitsNestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., the products at
issue were PERUGINA brand chocolates.76 The owners of the U.S.

registration sought to enjoin imports purchased from another authorized licensee in Venezuela. 77 The plaintiffs chocolates came from

Italy, had five percent more milk fat, were made from sugar syrup
rather than crystalline sugar, were made from cocoa beans from dif-

ferent countries, and were selling for $5.00 more per box than the
parallel imports.78 The First Circuit, reversing the trial court's find-

ing of no infringement, adopted a very low standard for materiality:
We conclude that the existence of any difference between the registrant's product and the allegedly infringing grey good that consumers would likely consider to be relevant when purchasing a
product creates a presumption of consumer confusion sufficient to
support a Lanham Trade-Mark Act claim. Any higher threshold
would endanger a manufacturer's investment in product goodwill
and unduly subject consumers to potential confusion by severing
the tie between a manufacturer's protected mark and its associated
bundle of traits.79

Section 42 of the Lanham Act thus provides that U.S. trademark
rights will not be exhausted by sales of products bearing those marks
that differ in ways material to consumers from those sold in the
flour not used as per regulation, and labels did not bear standard nutritional information);
Helene Curtis, Inc. v. National Wholesale Liquidators, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 152, 159 (E.D.N.Y.

1995) (gray market product differed materially from authorized product because it contained
ingredients that did not meet New York and California state requirements); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987) (Cabbage Patch Kids
dolls with "adoption" certificates in Spanish which were not accepted by U.S. doll adoption
agency materially differed); Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1240,
1244 (D.N.J.), aft'd, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1468 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds,
952 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1991) (gray market TIC TAC breath mints found to materially differ
when, inter alia, label did not contain information concerning serving size, servings per container, nutrient and mineral composition, gray goods had 2 calories each and genuine goods
1.5, gray goods failed to meet FDA labeling requirements, and labels used the British spelling
of words such as "flavour" and "colour").
75. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1124 (1988); see also Original Appalachian Artworks Inc. v.
Granada Elecs. Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987); Weil Cermics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878
F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
76. 982 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1992).
77. Id. at 635.
78. Id. at 642-43.
79. Id. at 641.
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United States."
In summary, exhaustion of U.S. trademark rights differs from
exhaustion of patent rights in several ways. First, there are two
sources of law to prevent imports: § 42 of the Lanham Act and § 526
of the Tariff Act. More importantly, trademark law contains a significant exception to the general rule that rights are exhausted by a
lawful first sale. The exception is for genuine products containing
material differences from those legitimately sold in the United States
under the mark. This exception makes intuitive sense in light of the
fundamental policy of trademark law, the prevention of consumer
source confusion.8 1 Finally, the specific provisions of § 526 and the
impact they have had on the interpretation of § 4282 set down some
specific rules which are lacking for patents.
C. Exhaustion of U.S. Copyrights
One of the exclusive rights of copyright is the right to distribute
copies of the work to the public. 3 Section 602 (a) of the Copyright
Act provides the basis for blocking parallel importation of copyrighted subject matter:
Importation into the United States, without the authority of the
owner of the copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords
of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501.4
Analogous to the exhaustion of patent rights under Univis Lens,
the distribution rights of the copyright holder are limited:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of
80. See Summit Tech. Inc. v. High-Line Medical Instruments Co., Inc., 922 F. Supp. 299
(C.D. Cal. 1996). See also Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
on remandfrom Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 796 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1992) (holding
that § 42 preempted the affiliate exception allowed by the Customs regulations enacted under § 526). This holding had the additional effect of broadening the class of parties with
standing to object to parallel imports. Because § 42 requires neither that the mark holder be a
U.S. citizen or corporation, nor that the goods to be of foreign manufacture, U.S. marks held
by foreign entities may be used under § 42 to block the reimportation of U.S. made goods or
the importation of foreign goods with material differences. GILSON, supra note 52, § 4.05[8]
nA0.
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988) (stating policies of Lanham Act).
82. See, e.g., Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc., v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1988).
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the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of

that copy or phonorecord."85 Application of the statutory language to
the issue of whether the distribution right is exhausted by first sales 6
of products subsequently acquired outside, and imported into, the

United States has proven difficult. The circuits that have ruled on the
matter are split.87 A reconciliation based on where the sale took

place has not proven appealing to the courts.
In Sebastian Internationalv. Consumer Contacts (PT19 Ltd.,88

plaintiff had manufactured hair care products in the United States for
shipment to South Africa. Several cases were reimported, and the
plaintiff used a copyright in the labels to try to block the parallel
trade. 89 The Third Circuit, after reviewing the district court cases that
had ruled on the matter, 9° held:
Section 602(a) does not purport to create a right in addition to
those conferred by section 106(3), but states that unauthorized importation is an infringement of "the exclusive [section 106(3)]
right to distribute copies." Because that exclusive right is specifically limited by the first sale provisions of § 109(a), it necessarily
follows that once a transfer of ownership has canceled the distribution right to a copy, the right does not survive so as to be infringed by importation. 91
The Ninth Circuit, in a series of cases, has consistently reached
85. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988).
86. The customary term "first sale" is used even though it is not strictly correct under the
1976 Copyright Act. Under the current Act, exhaustion of rights would appear to be preferable
to "first sale," a term which arose under the 1909 Act which used the word "sale". See infra
note 124. While a first sale will exhaust the distribution right of§ 106(3), the current statute
nowhere requires a sale, just ownership. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) ('Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy ... lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner to sell or otherwise dispose of
possession of that copy") with 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) ("The privileges prescribed
by... [ § 109(a)] do not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, extend to any person who
has acquired possession of the copy or phonorecord from the copyright owner, by rental, lease,
loan, or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it."). See also infra note 124.
87. See infra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
88. 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
89. Id. at 1094.
90. Of note among the prior district court cases is Columbia BroadcastingSys.' v. Scorpio Music Distrib., 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d
Cir. 1984) which construed the phrase in § 109(a) "lawfully made under this title" as referring
only to copies legally manufactured and sold within the United States thus excluding application of the exhaustion doctrine to authorized goods of foreign manufacture. This case has been
criticized by several district courts but, according to the Nimmers, "remains closest to the
legislative intent underlying what is admittedly a difficult statutory juxtaposition." 2 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER AND DAVm NIMmER, NimmR ON CopyurrH, § 8.12[B][6] (1996).
91. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099.
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the opposite conclusion. The first holding in BMG Music v. Perez9 2
followed the Scorpio93 rationale and held that § 109(a) only exhausted the distribution right if the first sale was within the United
States. 94 In Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium,95 the court
reached the same holding but changed the rationale.
Givenchy involved the parallel importation of perfume in boxes
bearing copyrighted designs. 6 Givenchy France had sold its interest
in the U.S. copyrights to plaintiff, its wholly-owned subsidiary, who

brought suit for unauthorized distribution of the perfume lawfully
acquired outside the United States.97 The court found BMG control-

ling but added, "[t]he logical outcome of a ruling that the U.S. copyright owner is precluded from interfering with U.S. distribution of
copies manufactured and lawfully sold abroad would be to deprive
the U.S. copyright holders of the power to authorize or prevent imports of the copies once the copies are sold abroad." 98 The court

found this outcome contrary to policy of copyright: "[Section 602(a)
in effect gives § 106(3) extraterritorial scope and] ensures that a U.S.
copyright owner will gain the full value of each copy sold in the
United States, by preventing the unauthorized importation of copies
sold abroad from being used as a means of circumventing the copyright owner's distribution rights in the United States." 99 Defendant

also asked that the common control exception under trademark law
be extended to copyright law. However, the court found neither
statutory nor policy support for this proposition.'0 0
The economic rationale recently became explicit in L 'Anza Research Internationalv. QualityKing Distrib., Inc.t0t where the Ninth
92. 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992). BMG had licensed the manufacture and sale of recordings in many countries. Perez purchased recordings

in the Philippines and imported them into the United States. The case rose to the Ninth Circuit
on a contempt proceeding after Perez ignored an injunction from the district court. Id.
93. See supranote 90 (describing Scorpio).
94. 952 F.2d at 39.
95. 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995).
96. Id. at 479.
97. Id. at 479.
98. Id. at 481 n.6.
99. Id. at 481 (citing Parfums Givency v. C & C Beauty Sales, 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1390
(C.D. Cal. 1993)). The court in effect reasoned that the profit-diminishing effects of allowing
gray imports could not have been contemplated by the drafters of the Copyright Act. This
rationale becomes more clear in later cases. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
100. Id. at 482-84.
101. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.
1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3650, (U.S. Mar. 25, 1997) (No. 96-1470)
[hereinafter L'Anza].
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Circuit again held that § 602(a) trumped the first sale doctrine in a

different factual context -the

goods were not made abroad (as in
0 2)

BMG and Parfums Givenchy

but rather manufactured in and ex-

ported from the United Sates. Plaintiff was the U.S. manufacturer of
hair care products who distributed its products domestically through

salons but internationally through foreign distributors. One shipment
to its U.K. distributor was bound for Malta but was reimported and
was being sold by defendant at retail stores. L'Anza alleged a viola-

tion of § 602(a) based on copyright in the labels.

3

The court repudi-

ated the Scorpio rationale that the location of the sale determined

whether there was a first sale for the purposes of § 109(a) °" and
stated that the test for whether there was a first sale for § 109(a) purposes is whether the copyright owner received the full value for the
copyright. 5 The court then reasoned that to allow parallel importation would prevent the copyright holder from receiving the full value

on U.S. sales because the parallel imports would undercut the
price.0

6

Thus, § 602(a) prevails over § 109(a).10 7

Moreover, the

102. The BMG and Givenchy courts had expressly declined to rule on this issue. Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 482 n.7.
103. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th
Cir. 1996),petitionfor cert filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3650, (U.S. Mar. 25, 1997) (No. 96-1470).
104. Id. at 1114-15.
105. Id. at 1115 (quoting Platt & Munk, Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847,
854 (2d Cir. 1963)).
106. [W]here the copyright owner sold U.S. manufactured goods at a substantial
discount, with the intent that they would be sold exclusively outside of the
United States[,] ... the unauthorized importation of these goods undercuts
L'anza's ability to receive the full value for L'anza products sold in the
United States through authorized channels, notwithstanding the fact that the
imported products were manufactured in the United States and sold by
L'anza.
Id. at 1117.
107. It is submitted, that the statutory construction issue posed by the interplay of sections
602(a), 109(a) and 106(3) is not as complicated as the Ninth Circuit has made it. The Circuit's
line of cases have struggled to find a rationale for setting aside the plain language of § 109(a)
when an understanding of § 602(a) does not necessitate it.
As the Sebastian court noted, section 602(a) purports to create no independent right but
rather makes clear that in some cases importation "is an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106(3), actionable under section 501.' 17
U.S.C. § 602(a) (1988). The plain language of 109(a) provides "the owner of a particular copy
or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.' 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988). The authorization of the
owner of a copy to sell that copy exists "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of 106(3"-the
right infringed by importation. Although the plain language of§ 109(a) provides that the right
to distribute copies under § 106(3) is exhausted by a transfer of ownership, statements in the
legislative history of § 602(a) have caused courts to inquire further, find the sections irreconcilable, then read out the application of § 109. But see FRaMcjs J. McCAsrant, STATUToRY
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court held that when a U.S. concern sells a copyrighted item to a foreign entity, there is no first sale when the gray marketeer later acquires the goods outside the United States. 108Apparently, at least in
CoNsTRuCToN 35-36 (1953) (as a principle of statutory interpretation, courts should find a
meaning of provisions which will give operation and effect to every part of the statute and
endeavor if at all practicable to find a harmonious reconciliation of provisions).
The legislative history which has led courts to find ambiguity refers to two types of importation § 602(a) seeks to prevent. The first is so-called "piratical" copies -"'those whose
making would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable."'
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5786. "The second situation covered by section 602 is that where
the copies or phonorecords were lawfully made but their distribution in the United States
would infringe the U.S. copyright owner's exclusive rights." Id. Reconciling this second
situation with § 109(a) would not seem on its face to be difficult. Section 602(a) prevented,
via § 106(3), the importation into the United States of copies that were lawfully made but
could not lawfully be distributed them in the United States. See, e.g., Sanof supra text accompanying note 41 (analogous patent situation). These situations arose when parties abroad,
who had not acquired a copy via a first sale, improperly transferred possession of their copies
to others who would then reimport. These were substantial copyright problems before the
1976 Act for which § 602(a) the solution. Viewing the section in this light does not require
negating Section 109(a). This position is in fact supported by the authority relied upon by the
L 'Anzacourt. It notes the complaints of a publisher:
[F]requently you run into a situation where there is a copyright proprietor in the
United States and copies of the same work.., produced in a foreign country,
may be shipped over here without violating any contract of the U.S. copyright
proprietor. This is either because... the [foreign] publisher sold it to an individual who in turn shipped it over here ...or because of some network of contract rights.
Confusingly, the language that "there is a copyright proprietor in the United States" and
the same work is being produced in a foreign country suggests that these were copies "whose
making would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable."
Assuming the reference is to lawfully made copies, the problem is similar to one that had been
occurring in the United States arising from the distribution of lawfully made copies which had
not been sold with the copyright owner's authorization. See Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic
Graphics. Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 853 (1963) (quoting Henry Bill Pub. Co. v. Smythe, 27 F. 914,
917-18 (S.D. Ohio 1886), internal quotations omitted):
Thus, it has been held that sale of a book purchased from a merchant who
bought it from an agent of the copyright proprietor, where the agent had been
entrusted with possession of the book but not with the actual authority to sell it,
is infringement; it does not matter whether the party offering to sell without [the
proprietor's] authority be a thief, or one in possession only by breach of trust, or
[by] ...some other less blamable means of acquisition. The absence of [the
proprietor's] authority to sell his literary property constitutes the defect of title,
no matter how that want of authority arises. Owing to the peculiar character of
this kind of property, the absence of the author's authority to sell is a defect of
title,and not a mere want of power.
The L'Anza court also relies on a complaint with respect to "motion picture prints, which are
sent [from the United States] all over the world-legitimate prints made from the authentic
negative. These prints get into illicit hands. They're stolen, and there's no contractual relationship ....
Now [these] are not piratical copies." L'Anza., 99 F.3d 1109, 1116. However,
the problem most likely sought to be prevented by this complaint arose because motion pictures prints were rarely sold to foreign distributors, not in spite of theirsale. As the Nimmers
note, "[u]ntil the advent of the videocassette era, motion picture companies rarely expressly
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the Ninth Circuit, the first sale doctrine does not completely exhaust
the rights of copyright if someone acquires the articles outside the
United States.

The policy-oriented approach taken by the L 'Anza court contrasts with a technical interpretation given to § 602(a) by a different

Ninth Circuit panel in a case argued shortly after L 'Anza. There the
panel held that when an exclusive distributor authorized by the copy-

right owner, rather than the copyright owner himself, tries to block
parallel imports, § 602(a) does not even apply. °9 In Costco, DAISA
held the copyright in Lladro figurines and licensed its manufacturers

to sell to all countries in the world without limitation. The manufacturers sell their output to a holding company who granted geographically exclusive licenses (plaintiff held the exclusive license for the
U.S.). When Costco, acquired the gray market figurines, § 602(a)
was unavailable to the exclusive U.S. licensee. 110 The license that
DAISA gave placed no limitation on sales within the United States,
thus implicitly authorizing them,' and "[s]ection 602(a) confers

power only on the 'owner of the copyright.""

2

Where the owner of

'sold' or transferred title in such [motion picture film] prints. The usual mode of exploitation
was through the rental of such prints." NMMm, supra note 90 § 8.12[B][1] (1996).
In light of the situations predating the 1976 Act, the provisions of §§ 109(a) and 602(a)
can be harmonized. Section 109(a) applies just as well for owners of lawfully made copies
abroad as it does for those in the United States, but this does not render the protections of
602(a) hollow. Section 602(a)'s protections exist to prevent against the harm that was present
before the 1976 Act, the importation into the United States of copies which were abroad in the
hands of parties who did not own them (see id.), copies wrongfully obtained from agents who
were not authorized to transfer them (see Henry Bill Pub. Co. v. Smythe, 27 F. 914, 917-18
(S.D. Ohio 1886), and copies whose importation would violate a mere contractual right (see,
e.g., Sanofi supra text accompanying note 41 ). See also 17 U.S.C. § 109(d).
108. [Defendant] appears to conflate the question of whether there was a "frst
sale" in the United States with the question of whether the goods were
"acquired outside of the United States" for the purposes of § 602(a). These
two inquiries are not the necessarily the same. In fact, it is not clear from the
statute which point in the chain of acquisition the requirement that a good be
"acquired outside of the United States" relates to.
[We reject the argument that the goods were not acquired outside of the
United States because the first sale occurred in the United States (even assuming that this is true). Such an approach would, de facto, limit the right
created in § 602(a) by the fist sale doctrine.
Id. at 1118.
109. Disensos Artisticos E Industriales, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 97 F.3d 377 (9th
Cir. 1996). In other words, the court held that licensees do not have standing to sue for violation of § 602(a).
110. Id.at380.
Ill. Id.at381.
112. Id.at380.
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the goods is different from the owner of the13copyright, it cannot
use § 602(a) to control its distribution network.'
Thus on the exhaustion of copyrights under § 109(a) the circuits
split. The lack of any consensus on this point is unfortunate because
copyright subsists without formality114 and its minimal creativity requirement' 5 will ordinarily allow most product labels and packaging
to contain copyrightable subject matter. A copyright claim will
therefore generally be available for the import of most products.
This will allow copyright to act as a de facto trade barrier against
goods formerly freely traded because of copyright in product labels -hardly a writing promoting the progress of science and the
useful arts. Copyright law has the prospect of rendering the statutory
provisions of the Lanham Act and the Supreme Court's holdings in
Univis Lens and K mart without effect for products bearing patents,
trademarks, and copyrights. Cases that raise this point have arisen.
However, they do not clarify copyright's role.

Denbicarev. Toys "R" Us116 involved the sale by a bankruptcy
trustee of goods which were in a U.S. foreign trade zone." 7 The
goods were patented, bore U.S. trademarks, and were in copyrighted
boxes.11 8 The trustee had previously sold the patents, trademarks, and
copyrights. The IPRs' new owner, who had begun selling newlymanufactured product, objected to sale of the goods within the
United States and Canada.1 19 The sale was allowed to proceed on the
condition that buyers not resell within the United States or Canada 120
The buyer violated the injunction and plaintiff brought suit against
the retailer who eventually acquired the goods - ignorant of the in113.

Id.at381-82.

114. See 17U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 104(1988).
115. See Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Sys., 499 U.S. 340 (1992).
116. Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996). See also
Summit Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., Inc., 922 F. Supp. 299, 307-314

(C.D. Cal. 1996) ) (where defendant was importing excimer lasers containing copyrighted
software and bearing plaintiff's trademarks which were manufactured by plaintiff and sold
abroad, the court held that Lanham Act remedies were unavailable because the goods did not
differ materially and § 602(a) was unavailable because plaintiff itself had produced the goods
and received its reward upon the first sale (adopting the rationale of Sebastian supra note 91)).

The Summit court was a district court within the Ninth Circuit.
117. Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1996).

118. Id.
119. Id. Parallel patents were held on the goods in Canada. Id. Claims of patent infringement were later dismissed. Id. at 1146.

120. 84 F.3d at 1145. The bankruptcy judge entered a permanent injunction against
"selling, reselling, distributing or disposing' of the [goods] in the United States and Canada." Id.
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junction.
On the copyright claim, alleging violation of § 602, the court
held that the goods were imported into the United States with the

authority of the copyright holder, plaintiff's predecessor in interest- that is, the foreign trade zone is not outside the United States
for purposes of § 602.121 The plaintiff argued that its exclusive right
to distribute copies was also violated and the court went on to interpret the first sale doctrine of § 109. Construing BMG and Drug Em-

porium the court concluded that § 109 only applies to copies made
abroad if the copies have been sold in the United States with the
copyright owner's authorization. 122 The court found that plaintiff had
consented to the sale, despite having fought for, and won, an injunction against precisely this type of sale: "Thus [plaintiff] McCoy consented to the sale of the copies; the fact that the buyers later violated
1
the conditions imposed on the sale does not negate his consent." 2
The court rejected plaintiff's further argument that its distribution
rights were not exhausted because it had not received a reward from
the goods' sale on the ground that the copyright owner had consented
to their sale. 24
121. 84 F.3d 1143.
122. Idatil5o.
123. l
124. Id. at 1150-51. The plaintiff cited Platt& Munk v. Republic Graphics,Inc., 315 F.2d
847 (2d Cir. 1963), a case interpreting § 27 of the 1909 Copyright Act which was the predecessor to § 109 of the current act. The court, not even conceding that a case interpreting § 27
is relevant to the interpretation of § 109, rejected the notion of application of a reward test in
this context:
Because the reward test of Platt & Munk is designed to determine when a sale
that is "not... truly voluntary" is a first sale, that test is irrelevant here: the
bankruptcy trustee's sale was voluntary as to Denbicare and to McCoy because
McCoy consented. Just as courts will not inquire into the sufficiency of consideration, there is no justification for reexamining the adequacy of the "reward"
received by the copyright owner in an alleged first sale where the owner has
consented to that sale.
Id. at 1151 (citation omitted). A different panel of the Ninth Circuit relied on Platt & Munk
and held the reward test was to be applied to determine whether a § 109 transfer exhausted the
§ 106(3) rights conferred by § 602(a). See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text
(describing L"Anza v. QualityKing).
The L'Anza court's reliance on the Platt & Munk case and the belief that the copyright
owner get the "full value" for a copy in order for § 109(a) to exhaust the distribution right is
likely misplaced. Under the plain language of § 109(a) no value whatsoever need be received
by the transferor in order for the distribution right to be exhausted with respect to that copy.
The section applies to "the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this
title." 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). Had full-value purchaser been intended, it is unlikely such an oversight in drafting would have occurred. Indeed, it would seem anomalous and strained to believe that Congress intended that someone who received a copy as a gift from the copyright
owner, such as a painting or a shampoo sample bearing a copyrighted label, could not transfer
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Having found a first sale under the copyright laws, first sale was
also found under trademark law: "Since the trustee's sale qualified

as a first sale for copyright purposes, it is a trademark first sale as
the copy without infringing § 106(3). Rather the notion of full value sale comes from illchosen language in a section of the 1909 act which was being construed in Platt & Munk.
Under the 1909 Act, the copyright owner had the exclusive right to publish and "vend" the
copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1909 act) reprintedin NIMMER, supra note 90, App. 6.
Section 27 of the 1909 act provided that:
The copyright is distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted
and the sale or conveyance ... of the material object shall not of itself constitute transfer of copyright... ; but nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid,
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession
of which has been lawfully obtained.
17 U.S.C. § 27 (1909 act) reprintedin NrMMER, supra note 90, App. 6 (emphasis added).
In Platt & Munk, the defendant-manufacturer obtained lawful possession of items embodying plaintiffs copyright through a contract for their manufacture. After claims the items
were defective the defendant exercised the right of resale of an unpaid seller then available
under New York Law. Platt& Munk, 315 F.2d at 849-50. The court noted:
[i]f lawful possession by another sufficed to deprive the copyright proprietor of
his right to control the transfer of the copyrighted objects, any bailee of such
objects could sell them without infringing the copyright .... In view ofthe necessary role played by manufacturers, shippers and others in producing and distributing copies of the copyrighted works,. . . a copyright proprietor could not
present his work to the public without the loss of part of his copyright protection. But the author is just as much injured by being deprived of the price of a
genuine copy as by having a piratical copy substituted for it. A literal reading
ofthe clause would mean, moreover, that an innocent purchaser of a copy from
a conceded pirate would be free to resell it without liability for infringement.
Id. at 851 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Faced with this problem caused by the ill-chosen word "possession," the court interpreted
the second portion of§ 27 in light of the first and required that there be a "first sale" or transfer
giving the copyright proprietor reward for the copy:
The forgoing makes it clear that the "first sale" which terminates the exclusive
right to vend patented or copyrighted objects need not be a truly voluntary one,
but can consist of some reasonable and recognized form of compulsory transfer .... In such cases the ultimate question embodied in the "first sale" doctrine---"f'whether or not there has been such a disposition of the article that it
may fairly be said that the patentee [or copyright proprietor] has received his
reward for the use of the article," United Sates v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265
at 278.
It is instructive to observe the Masonite Court's position:
There are strict limitations on the power of a patentee to attach conditions to the
use of the patented article. As Chief Justice Taney said in Bloomer v. McQuewan [supra note 28] when the patented product "passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is not longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside of it
and is no longer under the protection ofthe act of Congress." And see Adams v.
Burke [supra note 28]. In applying this rule, this Court has quiet consistently
refused to allow the form into which the parties chose to cast the transaction to
govern. The test has been whether or not there has been such a disposition of
the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee has received his reward for
the use ofthe article. And see UnitedStates v. Univis Lens Co. [supranote 21].
In determining whether or not a particular transaction comes within the rule of
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well.""1Plaintiff also argued that doctrine from patent law to the

effect that an implied license is granted to the first purchaser to use
and sell the patented item applied to trademarked goods and that the
the Bloomer case, regard must be had for the dominant concern of the patent
system. As stated by Mr. Justice Story ... the promotion of progress of science
and the useful arts is the "main object" reward of the inventors is secondary and
merely a means to that end. Or in. . . Kendall v. Winsor "Whilst the remuneration for genius and useful ingenuity is a duty incumbent upon the public, the
rights and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectually
guarded. Considerations of individual emolument can never be permitted to
operate to the injury of these.
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1942) (citations omitted).
Thus Platt & Munk and the authority it relies upon require only that the transaction alleged to have exhausted the right holder's right be one which remunerated them, whatever its
form. The notion of fair reward was for determining which non-sale transfers would still exhaust the rights. It would appear implicit in the passages quoted that a non-sale transfer compensating as much as a sale would exhaust the IPRs. There is nowhere a suggestion that some
sales the right holder consents to would not exhaust the rights because they were not at as high
a price as could have been obtained in a different market.
In Platt & Munk the value inquiry was conducted because of the language of § 27 of the
1909 act. But under the current act, this ambiguity is clarified by the statute. Section 202
splits out the distinction between the sale of copy and the sale of copyright. See 17
U.S.C. § 202 (1988). Section 109(a) makes explicit that ownership authorizes further transfer.
Section 109(d) makes it clear that mere possession does not. The enactment of §§ 202,
109(a), and 109(d) -- which do not even require a sale, let alone a full value sale, just true
ownership-solved the problem which troubled the court in Platt & Munk. The L'Anza
court's reliance upon an analysis needed under §§ 1 and 27 of the 1909 Act was misplaced
given the enactment of the current § 109. The Nimmers and the Second Circuit -which
handed down Platt & Munk- are in agreement: .
The current Act, by contrast [to the 1909 Act], contains a stand-alone provision
defining copyright ownership as distinct from the material object in which it is
embodied .... Section 109(a) then defines the instant defense, in contrast to the
old Section 27, as an exception to the copyright owner's exclusive public distribution right .... In other words, the authorized manufacturer [in Platt &
Munk], being "the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title" under the statute itself-regardless of whatever may be salted
away in the legislative history -"is entitled, without authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."
[While not altogether free from doubt, n]onetheless, on balance, it would
seem that the literal text of Section 109(a) should be followed, so that its immunity may be claimed by any "owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made," and not just those who acquired such ownership via a prior transfer
from the copyright owner. The Second Circuit's adoption of that logic [in
Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 632 (2d Cir. 1995)], some three decades after it handed down Platt & Munk, resolves that doubt for current applications.
NimaaE, supra 90, § 8.112[B][4].
Thus the reward test is likely not the law, and the better of the two positions articulated
by the Ninth Circuit is that of Denbicare.
125. Id. at 1151 (the court did not indicate whether situations could occur in which
"trademark first sales" would occur but not "copyright first sales").
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injunction created an express condition which ran with the goods as a
term of the implied license.' 26 The court noted that under copyright
law, conditions on the first sale do not run with the goods.' 27 and
found no reason for applying the
doctrines from patent law rather
12
than those under copyright law.
The setting of Denbicareprovides a good example of the disparate doctrines governing the exhaustion of U.S. intellectual property
rights. Under patent law, the exhaustion of rights doctrine is one of
judicial creation with differing factual contexts providing detail when
and how the international exhaustion of U.S. patent rights occurs. By
contrast, under the Copyright Act, there are explicit statutory provisions providing for exhaustion of U.S. copyright and a right to prevent infringing imports. Unfortunately, as the discussion in Part IL.C
shows this has not settled the matter, and the law is again evolving
case-by-case.
Trademark law presents yet a third regime, with Customs regulations allowing parallel imports in particular situations and the further limitation on the exhaustion of U.S. rights for genuine goods
which materially differ. Despite these differing regimes, no consistent policy analysis has emerged. One would expect the primary
question to be whether, in light of the policies served by free trade
and the intellectual property right, should the right be exhausted by
the first sale. When such analyses are attempted by U.S. courts, no
consistent answer has been reached.' 29 By, contrast, European Community law has focused on the policies underlying the intellectual
property protection as the following Part describes, however, this
approach too, has led to much litigation.
Hm. ExHAUsTIoN OF RIGHTS UNDER EUROPEAN UNION LAW
The European Union ("EU") has a more developed body of law
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir.

1978)).
128. Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996).
129. Compare Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266 F.
71, 79 (2d Cir. 1920) with L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d

1109 (9th Cir. 1996), petitionfor cert.filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3650, (U.S. Mar. 25, 1997) (No. 961470); Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys "." Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1996) and

Summit Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., Inc., 922 F. Supp. 299, 307-314
(C.D. Cal. 1996) with Griffm v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283, 1285
(E.D. Pa. 1978); Disensos Artisticos E Industriales, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 97 F.3d
377 (9th Cir. 1996) with Sanofi, S.A. v. Med. Tech Veterinarian Prod., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931,
938-39 (D. NJ. 1983).
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regarding parallel importation owing to the decades-long movement
towards a single market in the presence of national intellectual prop-

erty laws. 13 Article 30 of the EEC Treaty is the legal basis for the
general rule that national laws having the effect of restricting the free

flow of goods are impermissible.'

An exception to this general rule

for intellectual property laws is found in Article 36 which allows

such restrictions so long as they do not operate as a disguised restriction on free trans-EU trade."' There are specific prohibited practices
analogous to U.S. antitrust laws,13 1 the relevant ones being found in

Article 85, with an exception for those activities which promote
technical progress."

Generally, the interaction of these laws, and

the case law which follows, provides that the exclusive rights of intellectual property rights holders are exhausted' 35 when a article is
36
lawfully and consentingly first sold within a member state.1

130. The treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the Treaty of Rome,
was opened for signature in 1957. 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
131. Article 30 of Treaty establishing the European Economic Community provides,
"Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall ...be
prohibited between Member States." TRATY ESTABLISHING THE EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrrY
[EEC TREATY] art. 30.
132. Article 36 provides that Article 30 shall not "preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports, or goods in transit justified on grounds of... the protection of industrial and
commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member states." EEC
TRrATY art. 36
133. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
134. Article 85(1) provides a list of prohibited antitrust practices among them being the
controlling of markets, but Article 85(3) makes this section inapplicable to agreements or
practices "which contributes to improving the production, or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress." EEC TREATY art. 85.
135. The doctrine of exhaustion of rights was first articulated in Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, Case 78/70 1971 E.C.R. 487. See infra notes 139-143 and accompanying text
(more extensive discussion of case). There, Deutsche Grammophon sold records to its wholly
owned French subsidiary which were parallel imported back into Germany. The European
Court of Justice held that Article 36 (see supra note 132) may only be invoked to protect the
specific subject matter of the intellectual property right concerned. Since Deutsche Grammophon had voluntarily sold its copyrighted goods, it presumably reaped what the subject matter
of copyright was designed to protect.
136. This is the effect of Article 30. The principle of exhaustion of rights may not be
invoked by a parallel importer when the first sale is outside an EU Member State. Case 51/75,
EMI Records v. CBS United Kingdom, 1976 E.C.R 811, [1976] 2 CMLR 235 (1976). Here
the United States and Europe until
the COLUMBIA trademark shared a common owner in.
1917, the U.S. mark eventually being acquired by CBS, with EMI holding it in EU states.
CBS was enjoined from importing records bearing the COLUMBIA mark because prohibitions
in Article 30 on the free movement of goods only pertained to the movement within the EU.
Had CBS owned the mark in any one EU nation, imports into this nation could be used a
wedge, allowing subsequent trade throughout the EU.
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A. Exhaustion of Rights in the EU- Basic Doctrines

The distinction between the exercise and existence of intellectual property rights in the context of the exception in Article 36 is
also central to understanding the principle of exhaustion of rights

within the EU. The European Court of Justice ("ECJ') has held that
EU law does not impair the existence of intellectual property rights,
only their exercise.'37 This distinction becomes relevant in the context of Article 36 which has been interpreted to protect the "specific
subject matter" of intellectual property rights from exhaustion.'38
Thus, the basis of the exhaustion of rights principle for intra-EU
trade is that after a consenting first sale, the rights under national intellectual property laws cannot be exercised to protect anything other
than the specific subject matter of the IPR:. they are exhausted.
In Deutsche Grammophon v. METRO,139 the ECJ first recognized the exhaustion of rights principle in holding that rights under
copyright 140 were exhausted upon the first sale within the EU. Deut137. See Cases 56 and 58/64, Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-VerkaufsGmbH v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299, C.M.L.R 418 (1966). It was necessary that such a
distinction be drawn because Article 222 of the EEC Treaty provides that "[t]his Treaty shall
in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership."
This distinction is also relevant to interpretation of Art 4 bis of the Paris Convention: "(1)
Patents applied for in the various countries of the Union by nationals ofcountries of the Union
shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other countries, whether
members of the Union or not." Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
Mar. 20,1883, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, art. 4 his. The independence of patents under the Paris Convention is
consistent with the exhaustion of rights jurisprudence ofthe EU if independence is recognized
as the independence of the property right of the patent rather than the exercise of the right. See
id. art 4 bis (2): "The foregoing provision is to be understood ... in the sense that patents
applied for during the period of priority are independent, both as regards the groundsfor
nullity andforfeiture,and as regardstheirnormal duration." (emphasis added).
138. See, e.g., cases 267-68/95, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1 C.M.L.R.
83, 30 (1997) (patents: "to guarantee that the patentee has the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for
the first time, either directly or by the grant of licenses to third parties, as well as the right to
oppose infringements"); case 16/74, Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183, 8,
[1974] C.M.L.R. 480:
In relation to trade marks, the specific subject matter of the industrial property is
the guarantee that the owner of the trade mark has the exclusive right to use that
trade mark, for the purpose of putting products protected by the trade mark into
circulation for the first time, and is therefore intended to protect him against
competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade
mark by selling products illegally bearing that trade mark.
139. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. METRO-SB Grossmarkte GmbH &
Co., 1971 E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631.
140. As the term "copyright" is used here, the civil law distinction between copyright and
related rights is not material; both types of rights are analogously exhausted with exceptions
discussed in the following sections. Deutsche Grammophon's claim was premised on the
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sche Grammophon ("DG") manufactured sound recordings in Germany which were sold to its Parisian subsidiary, Polydor. Metro acquired the sound recordings and DG sought to enjoin their reimportation into Germany. The Hamburg court hearing the matter submitted to the ECJ the question of whether it was contrary to Articles 5
and 85(1) of the Treaty for a national law to be used to exclude the
parallel trade in these circumstances.'41 The court held that "[t]he

exercise of the exclusive right referred to in the question might fall
under the prohibition set out by Article 85(1) each time it manifests
itself as the subject, the means, or the result of an agreement."1 42 It
continued that the exercise of such a national law must be examined
in light of the principles in favor of the free movement of goods:
Amongst the prohibitions or restrictions on the free movement of
goods which [DG] concedes Article 36 refers to industrial and
commercial property. On the assumption that those prohibitions
may be relevant to a right related to copyright, it is nevertheless
clear from that article that, although the Treaty does not affect the
existence of rights recognized by the legislation of a Member State
with regard to industrial and commercial property, the exercise of
such rights may nevertheless fall within the prohibitions laid down
by the Treaty. Although it permits prohibitions or restrictions on
the free movement of products, which are justified for the purpose
of protecting industrial and commercial property, Article 36 only
admits derogation from that Freedom to the extent to which they
are justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the specific subject-matter of such property.
If a right related to copyright is relied upon to prevent the marketing in a Member State of products distributed by the holder of the
right or with his consent on the territory of another Member State
on the sole ground that such distribution did not take place on the
national territory, such a prohibition, which would legitimize the
isolation of national markets, would be repugnant to the essential
purpose of the Treaty, which is to unite national markets into a
protection afforded sound recordings under German law, a right akin to copyright but not
copyright in the strict civil law sense. Id.
141. Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. 2. Article 5 of the Treaty provides: "They
shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this
treaty." Article 85 (1) provides:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between member states and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of

competition within the common market."
142. Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. 487 2.
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single market.' 43
Deutsche Grammophon's distinction between the existence and
exercise of national IPR created the framework for subsequent
cases - copyright and otherwise. However, it was for Musik-Vertrieb Membran v. GEM414 to bring copyright fully under the
rubric of Article 36's "industrial and commercial property" language.
Musik-Vertrieb Membran involved sound recordings that were
sold in Britain and reimported into Germany. 4 GEMA, the German
performing rights society, brought actions on behalf of the copyright
owners for the difference in royalties owing in Britain and Germany
(1.25%). The defendant alleged that the principle of exhaustion prevented the collection of the additional royalty for importation into
Germany. 146 The court agreed and adopted its reasoning used in industrial property rights cases that having chosen to market in countries with differing royalty schemes it exhausted
its rights and could
147
not oppose further movement of the goods.
B. ExhaustionMay Occur Upon a FirstSale in a Member State
Where no 1PR was Available
When the intellectual property protection available for a particular article varies across member states, the issue arises whether
sales of an article in a state where no intellectual property protection
is available will exhaust the rights all member states so as to allow
parallel trade. The answer depends on whether the parallel trade
would offend the specific subject matter of the right involved. In
Merck v. Stephar,41 the ECJ held that patent rights in one member
state were exhausted with the sale in another member state where no
patent protection was available. Merck owned patents in the Netherlands on the composition and process for making the drug
Moduretic and marketed the product in Italy where no patent protection was available.' 49 Stephar purchased the drug wholesale in Italy
143.
144.
note 216
145.
146.
147.

Id. 11-12.
Cases 55 and 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. 174, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 44 (1981). See also Infra
and accompanying text (discussing case).
Musik-VenriebMembran, 1981 E.C.R. 17492-3.
Or demand the difference in royalty.
Musik-Vertrieb Membran, 1981 E.C.R. 174 25.

148. Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV,[1981] E.C.R. 2063, 3 C.M.L.R. 463
(1981). See also infra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing Slepharand related cases).
149. Id. 2-3. When the drug was first marketed in Italy no patent protection was available by decree. Id. 4. The decree was later held unconstitutional, but by then the invention
was no longer novel and hence unpatentable. Id.
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and sought to resell it in the Netherlands. Merck argued that the purpose of a patent is to allow the patentee to enjoy the rewards of the
exclusive right to first market the patented article, and that this was
not exhausted by the sale in Italy where there was no exclusive
right.150 The court, however, concluded that the patent right guaranteed the right to first market the product, but does not guarantee that
the patentee would obtain a reward in all circumstances.15 It rejected
Merck's argument, and held that, having chosen to market its product
in Italy, Merck exhausted its right to block reimportation into the
Netherlands:
It is for the proprietor of the patent to decide in light of all the circumstances, under what conditions he will market his product, including the possibility of marketing in a Member State where the
law does not provide patent protection for the product in question.
If he decides to do so, he must then accept the consequences of his
choice as regards the free movement of the product within the
Common Market, which... must be taken into account by the
proprietor of the patent in determining the manner in which his exclusive right will be exercised. 52
However, when an IP right holder does not consent to the first
sale, the right to block reimportation is within the specific subject
matter of the IPR and is not exhausted. For example, in EMI Electrola v. PatriciaIm-und Export,153 the defendant marketed sound recordings in Denmark which had fallen into the public domain
there.'54 The sound recordings were still protected in Germany and
EMI tried to prevent their import. The ECJ held that the exhaustion
of rights principle was inapplicable because the first sale was not due
to an act by, or with the consent of, the IP right holder or a licensee.1 55 The fact that any sale with the right holder's consent can ex56 Sterhaust IPRs was made clear in Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug.1
150.

Id. 11.

151.

Id.

13.

152. Id. 14. See also supra notes 184-194 and accompanying text (discussing Merck v.
Primecrown, a recent case which reaffirmed the reasoning of Stephar).
153. Case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export, 1989 E.C.R. 79, 2
C.M.L.R. 413 (1989).
154. Id. 2.
155. Id. 15. Compare Case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export,
1989 E.C.R. 79, 2 C.M.L.R. 413 (1989) with text accompanying supra note 53 (discussing
Katzel) and text accompanying supra note 23 (discussing Boesch v. Graf).
156. Case 15/74, Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2
C.M.L.R. 480 (1974). See supranotes 174-181 and accompanying text (discussing Centafarm
v. Sterling).
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ling held parallel patents in several Member States, including Britain
and the Netherlands, for the pharmaceutical Negram.5 7 With prices
for pharmaceuticals running 30% lower in Britain than in the Netherlands, Centrafarm purchased the drug in Britain for import into the
Netherlands.'5 8 While the court held that Sterling's rights were exhausted upon its sale of the drug'in Britain, it added:
Whereas an obstacle to the free movement of goods of this kind
may be justified on the ground of protection of industrial property
where such protection is invoked against a product coming from a
Member State where it is not patentable and has been manufactured by third parties without the consent of the patentee ... a
derogation from the principle of the free movement of goods is
not, however, justified where the product has been put onto the
market in a legal manner, by the patentee himself or with his consent, in the Member State from which it has been imported, in particular in the case of a proprietor of parallel patents. 59
What constitutes consent for a holder of parallel patents was
clarified to some extent in Pharmon v. Hoechst.6 ' Hoechst held parallel patents Germany, the U.K., and Holland for the drug
frusemide. 161 A British company obtained a compulsory license of
the patent pursuant to the British Patents Act of 1949.162 While the
license prohibited export, the licensee sold a substantial amount to
Pharmon for marketing in the Netherlands. 63 The ECJ held that the
marketing in a Member State under a compulsory license was not a
t64
consensual first sale that exhausted the patent rights.
These holdings are represented in text of the Agreement Relating to Community Patents (also known as the second Community
patent convention).1 65 Article 76(1) provides the general rule that
national patent rights would be exhausted by the first sale within an
EU state. 166 Article 76(2) provides that the exhaustion principle ap157. Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, 1974 E.C.R. at 1148.
158. Id. at 1154-49.
159. Id 11 (emphasis added).
160. Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 3 C.M.L.R. 775 (1985).

161. Id. 3.
Id. 4,5.
Id. 8.
164. Id. 24 ("[W]hen the competent authorities in a member-State ... grant a compul162.
163.

sory license to a third party patentee which allows him to carry out manufacturing and marketing operations which the patentee would normally have the power to prohibit, the patentee
cannot be regarded as having consented to the actions of the third party.").
165. Agreement relating to Community Patents, Dec. 15, 1989, 1989 OJ. 401.
166. Article 76(1) provides:
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plies not only where parallel patents are held by the same party in
multiple nations, but also to where the patentee in the exporting state
has "economic connections" with the proprietor of the patent in the
importing state. 67 The Pharmon holding is codified in Article
76(3).168 Article 28 provides that 6Community-wide
exhaustion would
1 9
occur under Community patents.
Although the second community patent convention has not been

ratified, trademark law in the EU has made concrete steps toward
formalizing the exhaustion of rights principle. A directive was
promulgated in 1988 to guide member nations in harmonizing national trademark law. 7 ' The directive provides for exhaustion of
trademark rights upon the first intra-EU sale made with the owner's

consent, 171 but national rights will not be exhausted "where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods

is changed or impaired."' 72 In addition, a separate regulation establishing the Community Trade Mark has been enacted which shares

similar provisions with respect to exhaustion of rights. 73
The rights conferred by a national patent in a Contracting State shall not extend
to acts concerning a product covered by that patent which are done within the
territory of that Contracting State after that product has been put on the market
in any Contracting State by the proprietor of the patent or with his express consent, unless there are grounds which, under Community law, would justify the
extension to such acts of the rights conferred by the patent.
167. Id. art 76(2). This article defines parties as having economic connections "where one
of them is in a position to exert a decisive influence on the other, directly or indirectly, with
regard to the exploitation of a patent, or where a third party is in a position to exercise such an
influence on both persons."
168. "[Article 76(2)] shall not apply in the case of a product put on the market under a
compulsory licence." Id. art. 76(3).
169. Id. art. 28:
The rights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to acts concerning
a product covered by that patent which are done within the territories of the
Contracting States after that product has been put on the market in one of these
States by the proprietor of the patent or with his express consent, unless there
are grounds which, under Community law, would justify the extension to such
acts of the rights conferred by the patent.
170. First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member
States relating to trade marks, Dec. 21, 1988, 1989 O.J. L 40.
171. Id. art. 7(1) ('The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in
relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that trade mark
by the proprietor or with his consent.").
172. Id. art. 7(2).
173. Council Regulation No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark,
Dec. 20, 1993, 1994 O.J. 11. Article 13 provides:
Exhaustion of the rights conferred by a Community trade mark:
1. A Community trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in
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C. Exhaustion ofPatentRights Laws in the EU

The general principles stated above are most readily applicable
to patent rights. The ECJ has stated that the specific subject matter
of patent rights is to reward the creative effort of the inventor by
guaranteeing that the patentee has the exclusive right to "use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting
them into circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant
of licenses to third parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements."

174

Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug75 first held that national patent
rights were exhausted with respect to products marketed in another
member state by the patentee or with its consent. 176 The issue before
the court was whether the policy in favor of the free movement of
goods in Article 30 of the EEC Treaty" prohibited the use of Dutch
patent law to prevent parallel imports of Negram originally marketed
in Britain by Sterling's subsidiary. 171 The ECJ reiterated the distinction between the existence and exercise of IPR, noting that only the
specific subject matter of the IPR was safeguarded by Article 36.179
In marketing the patented object within the EU first through its British subsidiary, Sterling Drug exercised the right which was the specific subject matter of patent protection, and thereby exhausted its
patent rights.' Attempts by the Dutch subsidiary to block the parallel imports was thus in derogation of the free movement of
goods.' 8'
Consent to the first marketing of the product plays a prominent
role in relation to patent law. Pharmon v. Hoechst,8 2 discussed
relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under
that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the

condition of the goods is changed or impaired afier they have been put on the
market.
174. Cases 267-268/95, Merck & Co. Inc. v. Primecrown Ltd., [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83,
30 (1996) citing case 15/74, Centrafram BV.v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147,
[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480.

175.

Case 15/74, Centrafram BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147, [1974] 2

C.M.L.R. 480 (1974).

176.

1974 E.C.R. 1147 15.

177.

See supra note 131 (text of Article 30).

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

SterlingDrug, 1974 E.C.R. 1147 4.
Id. 7-8.
Id. 10-15.
Id.
Pharmon BV. v. Hoechst AG, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. 775 (1985).
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above,183 adds the rule that sales under a compulsory license do not
exhaust patent rights, because the patentee is not freely consenting to
the exercise of the specific subject matter of her rights -the exclusive right to first market articles embodying the invention.
Patent rights throughout the EU are exhausted by a first intraEU sale despite the legal preclusion of patent protection for the marThis principle was first laid down in Merck v.
keted item.'
8
s
Stephar and recently reaffirmed in Merck v. Primecrown.186 The
cases are similar both factually and legally. The issue in the cases
arose from the fact that certain member states did not provide patent
protection for certain pharmaceuticals.' 87 In both cases, the U.K. patentee188 sold the pharmaceuticals in markets where no patent protection was available at a significantly lower price than in the U.K. The
suits were attempts to stop parallel importation of the goods into the
U.K. In Stephar,the advocate general concluded that the court's jurisprudence on exhaustion applied and suggested the court find the
patent rights exhausted by the sales in Member States where no patents were available.' 89 The ECJ agreed and held that, having voluntarily marketed its product in a Member State where no patents were
available, the patentee exhausted its right to prevent importation of
the goods. 190 Fifteen years later in Primecrown,the advocate general
urged reversal of the Stephar holding.' 9' The ECJ reaffirmed none-

183. See supranotes 160-164 and accompanying text (discussing Pharmon).
184. Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 463
(1981); cases C-267/95, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Primecrown, and C-268/95 Beecham Group plc
v. Europharm of Worthington, Ltd, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83 (1996).

185.
(1981).

Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 463

186. Cases C-267/95, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Primecrown and C-268/95 Beecham Group
pic v. Europharm of Worthington, Ltd., [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83 (1996).

187.

In Stephar, Italian law precluded patentability for Merck's drug Moduretic and its

manufacturing process. Stephar, 1981 E.C.R. 2063 2. In the consolidated cases in Primecrown, several pharmaceuticals invented by Merck and Beecham and protected by United
Kingdom patents were denied patent protection under Spanish and Portuguese laws. Primecrown, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83 r 3-4, 12-13.

188. Or a subsidiary.
189.

Stephar,1981 E.C.R. 2063.

190. It is for the proprietor of the patent to decide, in the light of all the circumstances, under what conditions he will market his product, including the possibility of marketing it in a Member State where the law does not provide patent protection for the product in question. If he decides to do so, he must then
accept the consequences of his choice.

Id. 11.
191.

Primecrown, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83 (1996), opinion of advocate general

201.
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theless. 192 Applying Stephar, the ECJ held that the presence of price
1 93
controls in the exporting state did not render Stephar inapplicable.
However, if a plaintiff were able to prove that it had a legal obligation to market the product in the exporting state, then its national patent rights in other Member States would not be exhausted by a sale in
the exporting state.

94

D. Trademarksand ParallelImports in the EU
The first sale of trademarked goods within the EU generally exhausts national trademark rights.'95 In addition, rights under the new
Community trademark are exhausted upon the first sale within the
EU, except when there are "legitimate reasons to... oppose further
commercialization of the goods."' 96 The doctrinal provisions with
respect to trademark law do not differ greatly from those of patent
law discussed above: rights under national trademark laws are exhausted by the first sale in the EU unless the right being enforced is
the specific subject matter of trademarks. The specific subject matter
of trademarks is:
the guarantee that the owner of the trade mark has the exclusive
right to use that trade mark, for the purpose of putting products
protected by the trade mark into circulation for the first time, and
is therefore intended to protect him against competitors wishing to
take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark by
selling products illegally bearing that trade mark.'97
192.
193.

Id.
lId

33.
47.

194. Id. 50.
195. See, e.g., case 16/74, Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop, 1974 E.C.R. 1183 (where exclusive licenses to the trademark NEGRAM for a pharmaceutical were given in Britain and the
Netherlands and goods purchased in Britain were imported into the Netherlands, the court held

that the purpose oftrademark protection was to allow for the first sale of the product free from
competitors trading on the status and reputation of the mark, and that having consented to the

sale in Britain, subsequent prohibitions on the free movement of the goods would be inconsistent with the EEC Treaty).
196. Council Regulation, 40/94, 1004 O.J. (L 11) art. 13. The article provides:
Exhaustion of rights conferred by a Community trade mark

1. A Community trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in
relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under
that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the

condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the
market.
197.

Case 9/93, IHT Internationale Heitztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, (1994]

3 C.M.L.R. 857 33 (1994) (citing case 16/74, Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop, 1974 E.C.R.
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However, two particular issue relating to trademarks have arisen: the
repackaging of goods and former corporate affiliations.
1. Repackaging of goods1 9
Pharmaceuticals are frequent sources of parallel trade. The differences in the trademark under which the product is sold 99 or the
quantities in which the product is generally prescribed in the destination country2m require repackaging of the product. A line of cases
has developed the conditions under which national trademark rights
20 1
will be exhausted despite their repackaging by a parallel importer.
In order to successfully remarket a repackaged product, a parallel
importer must reaffix the proper trademark and show:
1.The repackaging is necessary in order to market the product in a
member state and is carried out in a manner which does not affect the condition of the product;
2.The repackaging cannot affect the original condition of the
product inside the packaging;
3.The new package clearly states who repackaged the product and
the name of the original manufacturer;
4. The presentation of the repackaged product is not liable to damage the reputation of the trademark or its owner;
5.The importer gives notice to the trade mark owner before the repackaged
product is put on sale and provide a sample on de202
mand.

1183 8).
198. It should be made clear that this situation is distinct from a parallel importer merely
importing branded goods without any modification and frequently involves the removal of old
packaging, adding new inserts appropriate for the destination country, manipulating blister
packs to get the desired quantity, and adding indication of the repackaging party.
199. See, e.g., case 3/78 Centrafarm B.V. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 1978 E.C.R.
1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326 (1978) (medicinal oxazepamum sold by plaintiff under
SERENID D mark in Britain and SERESTA mark in the Benelux countries).
200. See, e.g., joined cases 427/93, 429/93, and 436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova
A/S, 1996 CEC (CCH) 716 (1996).
201. See case, 102/77, Hoffinan-La-Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm, 1978 E.C.R. 1139
(1978); case 3/78 Centrafarm B.V. v American Home Prods. Corp., 1978 E.C.R. 1823, [1979]
I C.M.L.R. 326 (1978); case, 1/81, Pfizer v. Eurim-Pharm, 1981 E.C.R. 2913; joined cases
427/93, 429/93, and 436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A1S, 1996 CEC (CCH) 716
(1996).
202. Joined cases 427/93, 429/93, and 436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova A/S,
1996 CEC (CC) 716 (1996).
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2. Former Corporate Affiliation

A series of cases have addressed the issue of whether former
corporate affiliation between the holders of a mark in separate member states bars the use of national laws to prevent importation of legitimate goods bearing the plaintiffs mark, i.e., whether former corporate affiliation exhausts trademark rights vis d vis the former affiliate.203 In Sirena,2° the ECJ held that the assignee of a mark in one
Member State was barred from using its national trademark rights to
prevent importation of goods marketed in another Member State by
the assignor. This early holding was extended in Hag I'l which involved the HAG trademark for coffee originally owned by a Hag AG
in Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. Before World War II, Hag
AG set up a subsidiary in Belgium, which held the ownership rights
to the mark in Belgium and Luxembourg. 2°6 After the war, the company was expropriated as enemy property and the marks were eventually acquired by Van Zuylen Freres who opposed imports of Hag
coffee from the original German company. The ECJ held that national trademark rights could not be used to prohibit goods made in
another member state under an identical trademark having the same
origin.20 7 The roles were reversed in Hag 11,208 wherein the German
Hag sought to prevent importation of Belgian HAG goods into Germany. The ECJ reversed the holding of Hag L Stressing the lack of
consent to the marketing of challenged goods and the source identifying aspect of a trademark, the ECJ held that each of the proprietors
of the HAG mark could oppose importation and marketing within
their own territories of goods marketed by the other.2°
Hag IHwas limited by the ECJ to its factual setting involving an
involuntarily transferred mark;2"0 this left unanswered the question of
what types of transfers from a common origin would retain national
trademark rights for the parties. This was answered in Ideal Stan203.

Case 40/70, Sirena S.r.. v. Eda S.r.. 1971 E.C.R. 69, [1971] C.M.L.R. 260 (1971);

case 192/73, Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731, (1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (1973)
[hereinafter Hag I]; case 10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 3711, 3
C.M.L.R. 571 (1990) [hereinafter Hag II]; case 9/93, IHT Internationale Heitztechnik GmbH v.
Ideal-Standard GmbH, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 33 (1994) [hereinafter Ideal Standard]
204. Case 40/70, Sirena S.r.1. v. Eda S.r.l., 1971 E.C.R. 69, [1971] C.M.L.R. 260 (1971).
205. Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R., [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127

(1974).
206. Id. at 732.
207. Id. at 743.
208. Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG GF AG, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (1990).
209. Id.
23.

210. Id.

19.
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dard.2" American Standard had licensed its trademark for heating
equipment and sanitary fittings to Ideal Standard -its German sub-

sidiary (GIS) -and

a similarly named French subsidiary. Through

several transactions, the rights in the French mark for heating were

held by a company completely unrelated to American Standard.
When the French company's German subsidiary tried to import

heating products into Germany, where GIS had ceased production,
GIS objected. The ECJ held that the assignments did not preclude

GIS from opposing the imports.2" Stressing the consistent-qualityindicating function of trademarks, the court reasoned that once a
mark has been transferred to an unrelated party, the original owner

cannot exercise control of the quality of the goods.213 The role of a
trademark to indicate a consistent quality would therefore be
thwarted if importation could not be stopped.
E. Exhaustionof Copyrightand NeighboringRights in the EU
Rights in copyrighted2 14 works are subject to exhaustion upon
211. Case C-9/93, Intemazionale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal Standard, 1994 E.C.R. I2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (1994). See generallyNote, Ideal Standard v. IHT: In the European Union, Must a Company Surrenderit's National Trademarks when it Assigns its Trademark?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1178 (1996).
212. Case C-9/93, Internazionale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal Standard, [1994] 3
C.M.L.R. 857 60 (1994).
213. Id. 41.
214. The phrase "copyrighted" will be used to refer to both classical copyright and neighboring rights as the distinction is irrelevant for the purposes of the discussion.
In Musik-Vertrieb Membran v. GEMA, cases 55 and 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. 174, [1981]
2 C.M.L.R. 44 (1981), it was argued by the French Government that because copyright protects the moral rights of authors which were not subject to exhaustion, copyrights should be
distinguished from patent and trademarks for purposes of exhaustion of rights. Id. 12. The
court rejected this distinction and clearly brought copyrights within exhaustible rights:
[Tihe French Government has argued that... [the existing] case-law cannot be
applied to copyright, which comprises inter alia the [moral rights of
authors] .... It is contended that, in thus conferring extended protection, copyright is not comparable to other industrial and commercial property rights such
as patents and trade-marks.
It is true that copyright comprises moral rights of the kind indicated by the
French Government. However, it also comprises other rights, notably the right
to exploit commercially the marketing of the protected work .... It is this economic aspect of copyright which is the subject of the question submitted by the
national court and, in this regard, in the application of Article 36 of the Treaty
there is no reason to make a distinction between copyright and other industrial
and commercial property rights.
While the commercial exploitation of copyright is a source of remuneration
for the owner it also constitutes a form of control on marketing exercisable by
the owner .... From this point of view commercial exploitation of copyright
raises the same issues as that of any other industrial or commercial property
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the first sale within the EU. The principle was first articulated in
Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro as discussed above. 215 Cases after
Deutsche Grammophonrefined which of the rights incident to copyright are subject to exhaustion.
Musik-Vertrieb Membran v. GEMA216 held that royalties owing
for sound recordings were exhausted when a parallel importer took
them from a Member State with a lower rate to one with a higher
rate. The court reasoned that having chosen to market in this way,
the copyright holder must live with the consequences of aligning
copyright with other industrial and commercial property.217 Not all
of the rights incident to copyright are subject to exhaustion. Warner
Bros. v. Christiansenz 8 held that a lending right for videotapes was
not subject to exhaustion. Warner Bros. owned the copyright in a
film and assigned the video production rights in Denmark to coplaintiff Metronome. The defendant purchased a video copy of the
film in Britain in contemplation of renting it out in Denmark which
would violate an exclusive right of Metronome.2 1 9 The defendant
argued that Membran should govem, n0 but the ECJ recognized that
rental rights reflect the value in the repeated performance of a work
and held the right not exhausted."'
Further recognizing the ongoing nature of some of the copyrights, Coditel v. Cing-Vog Films' held that performance rights in a
film were not subject to exhaustion. The case involved the unauthorized rebroadcast of a German television transmission of the film
Le Boucher in Belgium by Coditel, a Belgium cable television company.m The copyright owner apparently granted rights for the film
to be broadcast in Germany while simultaneously granting exclusive
right.
Id. 11-13.
215. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing Deutsche Grammophon).
216. Cases 55 and 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. 174,2 C.M.L.R. 44 (1981).

217. Id. 25.
218.

Case 158/86, 1988 E.C.R. 2605, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 684 (1988).

See also

17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988) (exhausting distributionright).
219. Id. 4-5.
220. Id. 18.

221. Id. % 14-17. "[Where national legislation confers on author a specific right to hire
out video-cassettes, that right would be rendered worthless if its owner were not in a position

to authorize the operations for doing so." Id. 19.
222.

Case 62/79, Coditel SA, v. Cin6-Vog Films SA, 1980 E.C.R. 881, [1981]

2 C.M.L.R. 362 (1980).
223.

Id.

2-3. Cin6-Vog owned the rights to distribute the film in Belgium (Id.

5) and

the exclusive right to exhibit the film publicly in Belgium starting forty months after the first
showing of the film in Belgium. Id. 14.
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Belgian rights to Cin6-Vog. When the film was broadcast in Germany, Coditel picked up the broadcast and retransmitted it over its
cable network- contrary to Cin6-Vog's rights. The court distinguished performance rights from those of reproduction and held the
performance right not exhausted. 224 While Coditel involved the provision of services (broadcast), its holding has been extended to the
performance rights in copyrighted goods.,
In sum, distribution rights are exhausted with the first sale in the
EU, 226 but performance rights are not.

7

A parallel importer is not

liable for the difference in royalty payments a copyright holder
charges in different nations. 8 A parallel importer, however, can be
blocked from lending out gray market copies in countries with lending rights or exercising other continuing rights. 229
F. Laws ofMember States
The foregoing concerned the laws governing the exhaustion of
intellectual property rights under the national laws of member nations
of the European Union. These Member States have their own jurisprudence with respect to exhaustion of rights for non-EU trade as
well. While it is beyond the scope of this comment to survey the
laws of all member nations, 23° it should be noted that many European
nations have adopted the principle of international exhaustion for
some intellectual property rights.231 It is unclear in this context
whether the trademark harmonization directive 232 which codifies the
224. Id. 13-14.

225. Case 402/85, Basset v. S.A.C.E.M., 1987 E.C.R. 1747, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R.
173 (1987).
226. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, 1971 E.C.R. 487. See supra note 61
(describing the case).
227. Case 395/87, Ministere Public v. Tournier 1989 E.C.R. 2521.
228. GEMA, a German copyright protection organization sought the difference in royalties charged in Britain (the source of the gray market sound recordings) and Germany (their
destination) the court held the copyrights exhausted because the right holder was free to put his
goods on sale wherever they chose; having chosen to market in Britain they reaped their cho-

sen reward with the first sale). Combined cases 55 & 57/80 Musik-Vertrieb Membran
v. GEMA 1981 E.C.R. 147.
229. Case 158/86, Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2521.
230.

For an extensive survey of the laws relating to parallel imports in Europe, see

WARvwcK RoTHNm,
PAPALLEL IMPORTS, (1993).

231.

See generally Mario Fanzosi and Giustino de Sanctis, Are National IP Rights Be-

coming Obsolete, (May 1996) <http://www.ipww.com/may96/p8are.html>; J. Rasmussen, The
PrincipleofExhaustion of Trade Mark Rights Pursuantto Directive 89/104 (and Regulation
40/94), 4 EUR. INTELL. PROP. Ray. 174 (1995).
232. See supra notes 170-173 and accompanying text (discussing trademark directive and
regulation).
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principle of European exhaustion precludes a Member State from
adopting international exhaustion. That is, it is unclear whether the
European exhaustion principle in the trademark directive provides a
minimum level of protection for rights-holders or whether it provides
a minimal level of protection for consumers by barring impediments
to the free movement of goods. At the time of this writing, it was too
early to tell what the ECJ's views on this issue were, but whatever
the resolution, it will play a key role in movement towards harmonization of the exhaustion of rights principle. This is particularly true
in that a significant trading nation -

Japan -

appears to have

adopted the principle of international exhaustion.
IV. EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS UNDER JAPANESE LAW

Compared to the European Union, Japan has relatively little case
law on the subject of parallel imports. There have been cases dealing
with trademark, copyright, and patent, with a recent patent case likely
being the best indicator of where the Japanese courts now stand on
the issue.
The Japanese Trademark Act provides that importing goods that
bear marks confusingly similar to registered marks constitutes infringement. 3 However, in ParkerPen,"3 the court held that genuine
goods imported by the exclusive Hong Kong licensee could be distributed in Japan over the objection of the exclusive Japanese licensee. The court reasoned that the policy of trademark was to identify
the source of the goods and guarantee their quality z 5 Since the
goods were genuine, indeed identical, to plaintiffs pens, there was
no substantive wrong because the consuming public would not be
confused. 236 Subsequent amendments to the Tariff Act made explicit
when parallel imports of trademarked goods are permissible:
The permission to make parallel imports of genuine goods extends
to those goods which were legitimately trademarked and distributed by a person who is the trademark right holder in Japan or who
has a special relationship with the trademark right holder in Japan
so that both persons can be regarded as one person. But if the
source or quality indicated or guaranteed by the trademark at-

tached to the goods thus distributed differs from the source or
quality indicated or guaranteed by the trademark under petition
233.
234.
Feb27,
235.
236.

4 ZENTARo KITAGAWA, DorNa BusiNiss INJAPAN § 3.07[4] (1996)
Id. (citing Osaka District court, N.M.C.K.K. v. Shriro Trading Co., 2 Mutai Shu 71
1970).
Id.
Id.
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and the trademark as used by the parallel importer is considered to
be separately used under circumstances similar to those of the petitioner's trademark, then in such cases those genuine goods
should be excluded from Japan. 7
A 1994 judgment in the Tokyo District Court indicates that in
some contexts, Japanese copyrights will not be exhausted by first
sales abroad.281 The plaintiff sold videotapes in Japan and imported
from the United States 1000 copies of the movie "101 Dalmatians." 9 The defendant was in the business of selling pre-recorded
video tapes and discs for home use.240 The defendant distributed a
paper to alert the business circles that parallel importation of video
cassettes from the United States was illegal.2 41 The plaintiff sued
alleging that distribution of the paper interfered with its sale of the
"101 Dalmatians" videos.242 The Tokyo District Court reasoned that
importation into Japan of video cassettes of a movie not yet released
in Japan or still in theaters, would seriously damage the market for
the movie as well as sale of authorized video tapes and found for the
defendant.243 Also relevant to the court was the fact that the license
grant to the manufacturer in the Unites States was not thought to be
in contemplation of, and with consideration for, distribution in Ja244
pan.
In the patent context, there are two key Japanese cases.2 45 The
first, a 1969 case, involved the import of used pin-setting machines
from Australia which were covered by Japanese and Australian patents. 24 The court there held that the sale in Australia did exhaust the
Australian patent rights, but not those in Japan, and found infringe248
ment.247 A 1995 case reversed this holding.
The case, Japauto Products Kabushiki Kaisha v. BBS Kraftfahrzeugtechnik ("aluminum wheels case"), held that the first sale of
237. Id. (citing Finance Ministry directive of 08/25/1972 Kurakan No. 1443).
238.

Shigeo Ohshima, Japanese Courts Define Bounds of Parallel Import Restriction,

(visited Mar. 27,1997) <http'//www.thelawoffice.omInLLaw/CILS/IRIP0996.HTM>.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Nanao Naoko, et. al., Decisions on ParallelImports of Patented Goods, 36 IDEA:
J.L. &TECH. 567, 568 (1996).

246. Id. at 568-59.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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a patented item outside of Japan also exhausts the patent rights in
Japan.249 The case involved the parallel import of patented aluminum
wheels covered by Japanese and German patents. Plaintiff BBS both
manufactured its own wheels and licensed another to do so in Germany. The defendants purchased wheels in Germany and imported
them into Japan where BBS brought suit under its Japanese patents.25
The Tokyo High Court, reversing the lower court's finding of infringement, held that the plaintiff was adequately compensated by his
sale in Germany and the provision of an additional royalty merely for
the goods crossing national borders was unwarranted. 2 t The court
thus extended the doctrine of exhaustion of rights from those sales
taking place in the destination country to all authorized sales.
V.

NEED FOR HARMONIZATION

The issue of parallel importation arises because of the ease of
transnational commerce. As the transborder flow of goods increases
the problem will grow even more pressing. At the same time, there is
a movement towards the harmonization of intellectual property laws.
It is proper that the confused state of the law of parallel trade be addressed in international fora. However, analysis of the current law of
exhaustion of rights reveals deeper divisions in the law of the United
States and its major trading partners than may be amenable to simple
solutions.s 2
A. Nature ofExhaustedRights
There are three differing principles represented in U.S. law on
what exhausts intellectual property rights. The first, and most well
established, comes from cases arising under the patent laws and focuses on the transfer of the property interest in the article. For example, in Holiday v. Mattheson, 3 the court stated "[w]hen the owner
249. Id. at 270-71.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 271.
252. At the December, 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (W.I.P.O) Diplomatic Conference, the United States proposed to add a provision to the Beme Protocol which
would prevent importation of copyrighted works even after an authorized first sale. W.I.P.O.

Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Amendments
to Articles 6, 8,9 and 16 of Draft Treaty No. 1 proposed by the Delegation of the United States
of America (Dec. 12, 1996) <http://www.wipo.intlengldiplconf/distrib/6Ode.htm>.

The pro-

posed amendment was not adopted but its proposal, and the eventual inclusion of a more limited provision in the adopted treaty, indicates how a potentially dramatic shift in world intellectual property and trade policy can be quickly effectuated.

253. 24 F. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1885); see supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing
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sells an article without any reservation respecting its use ...the purchaser acquires the whole right of the vendor in the thing
sold... .",,4 The court in Univis Lens'-5 similarly focuses on transfer
of interest in stating that "[a]n incident to the purchase of any article,
whether patented or unpatented, is the right to use it and sell it... the
authorized, sale.., is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with
respect to-the article sold."'"5 6
A recent copyright case followed a very different principle
which maintains that only sales which give the right holder the full
value of the sale exhaust the rights. 7 This principle focuses more on
the interests of the right holder than those of its transferee and represents an emphasis on the means chosen by Congress -the
incentives in the Copyright Act -rather than the goals of copyrightprovision of works to the public.'" That is, only sales which discharge what the court believes to be the statutory purpose of assuring
the right holder the "full value" of their IPR. For example, in L'Anza
the court states that "when title passes does not necessarily indicate a
'sale' for the purposes of the 'first sale' defense to copyright infringement ....
,,'-9 The court also states that "once the copyright
owner has received his full value for the copy, the policy goal of
protecting the copyright holder gives way to the policies disfavoring
limitations on the alienation of property."'-60 So to the L'Anza court,
exhaustion of rights was not an incident to the sale, but rather the
result of balancing competing policies. It is unclear whether this new
notion has broad acceptance. The L'Anza court was a different panel
of the Ninth Circuit than that in Denbicare6 five months earlier
which construed the same authority relied upon by the L 'Anza court
but reached the opposite conclusion: "Just as courts will not inquire
into the sufficiency of consideration, there is no justification for reexamining the adequacy of the 'reward' received by the copyright
Holiday).
254.
255.
256.

Id.
United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241(1942).
Id. at 249.

257. L'Anza Research Intl., Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.
1996),petitionfor cerL filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3650, (U.S. Mar. 25, 1997) (No. 96-1470).
258. See generally Sony Corp. Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423
(1983).
259. Id. at 1113 (citing the lower court's opinion in the same case). See also supra notes
101-107 and accompanying text (discussing L'Anza).
260. 93 F.3dat 1113.
261. Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996). See also
supra notes 116-128 and accompanying text (discussing Denbicare).
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owner in an alleged first sale where the owner has consented to that
sale." 26 2

Cases under the trademark laws recognize a third principle in
the common control doctrine. 63 Under this principle, when the
source of the goods in the exporting nation is under common control

with the authorized seller in the importing nation, parallel trade cannot be stopped under the trademark laws. This is, in effect, exhaus-

tion of the U.S. mark-holder's rights through first sales by affiliated
parties. The Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected extending this no-

tion to copyright." 4 Yet, paradoxically, the Ninth Circuit has also
held that the same standard applies for determining whether a first

sale has occurred under § 109 of the Copyright Act2 65 as under the
trademark laws.2ss
Thus, under U.S. law, there are three different principles deter-

mining whether the sale of item embodying IPR will exhaust those
rights. By contrast, under EU law, a single principle has traditionally
applied. The policy in favor of the free movement of goods provides
national IP rights are exhausted by the first authorized intra-EU
sale. 67

The nature of IP rights in the European Union which are subject
262. Id at 1151. In addition, the L'Anza court adopted a reward test which conflicts with
the position of our major trading partners and frustrates moves towards harmonization. The
L'Anza adopted a "full value" test: distribution rights are only exhausted with respect to lawfully made goods being imported if the copyright owner has received the price charged in the
United States. An alternative reward test would be whether the copyright owner received the
reward flowing from the exclusive right to first market the product. Under this reward test,
having chosen to market its goods as it did, L'Anza would have to live with the consequences
because it exercised its right to distribute copies of its label. This is the approach taken by the
European Court of Justice with respect to copyrights in Musik-Vertrieb Membran (see also
supra note 216 (describing case)) and patents (seesupra notes 185, 186, and infra notes 270271 and accompanying text (describing Merck cases holding that sales in countries denying
patent protection exhaust patent rights in other countries because considering all market factors
patentee chose to exercise the right to first market the product)). Japanese courts appear to
take the same approach with respect to patents. See supra Part IV. The full value test for
patents was implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court for patents in Adams v. Burke supra note
28 and accompanying text. Adams was essentially a parallel import case, but with the parallel
trade taking place within different exclusive territories in the state of Massachusetts. The
Court held that when right holder sold the good and received his consideration this exhausted
the rights. See id.
263. See, e.g., Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc., v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
264. Parfuns Givency Inc. v. Drug Emporium, 38 F.3d 477,482 (9th Cir. 1994).
265. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
266. Denbicare U.S.A., Inc. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Since the ... sale qualified as a first sale for copyright purposes, it is a trademark first sale as
well.').
267. See supra Part III.
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to exhaustion265 most closely parallels rights under the U.S. patent
law with aspects of the common control principle. The full reward

theory has been implicitly rejected by holdings such Musik-Vertrieb
Membran v. GEMA269 where the ECJ refused to prevent the parallel

importation of sound recordings on account of a difference in royalty
rates between the importing and exporting country. The ECJ's reli-

ance on a consenting first sale in the Stephar and Primecrown cases
provides further insight.7 0 In both cases, the ECJ made clear that,

having consented to the first sale within a Member State, the right
holder exhausts national patent rights, despite the unavailability of
patent exclusivity, and accompanying supracompetitive profits in that

nation."7 ' This parallels U.S. patent cases such as CurtissAeroplane
where the court stated "[a]s the plaintiff has already been paid for
these aeroplanes the full price it asked, it is no longer concerned
about the price at which the article is sold, or whether the article is
kept in Canada [the exporting country] ... or in the United States
'
[the importing country]."272

The common control principle found in U.S. trademark law273 is

also represented in aspects of EU law. Most indirectly, but more
forcefully than in the United States, the principle exists in the legal

principle that a consenting first sale exhausts national IP rights. Ordinarily where the plaintiff and the exporting organizations would be

under common control, such as parent and subsidiary, or geographically distinct exclusive licensees, the marketing of the product is with
the consent of the IP right holder. That is, the sale of the item was

with the consent of the right holder and the exhaustion question
268. Those rights of the author known in the U.S. as moral rights are not subject to exhaustion. See Musik-Vertrieb Membran v. GEMA, cases 55 and 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. 174, 2
C.M.L.R. 44 12 (1981).
269. Cases 55 and 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. 174, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 44 (1981). See also supra
notes 144-147 and accompanying text and notes 216-217 and accompanying text (discussing
case).
270. See supranotes 184-194 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
271. See supra notes 184-194 and accompanying text (discussing cases). See also Pharmon, supra notes 160-164 and accompanying text. In Pharmon,where the first sale was under
a compulsory license national patent rights were not exhausted because of the lack of consent.
This lends support to the proposition in the text in two ways: (1) were the ECJ applying a
reward theory, the compulsory license would, ipso facto, negate full reward having been received, and (2) had consent to the first sale not been the underlying principle, the ECJ could
have reached a contrary holding and better serve the policy in favor of the free movement of
goods.
272. Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266 F. 71, 79 (2d
Cir. 1920). See also Sanofi, S.A. v. Med. Tech Veterinarian Prod., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931,
938-39 (D. NJ. 1983).
273. See supra Part I.B.
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arises because of a parallel importer. The same situation arises under
EU law and is dealt with indirectly through the IP right holder's consent to the marketing either directly or through a licensee.274 Thus
EU law, theoretically the most compact and consistent across intellectual property doctrines, illustrates by way of contrast the ad hoc
manner in which analogous principles coexist in the United States.
Japanese law provides yet a third example which sheds light on
the differences in exhaustion under both U.S. and EU law. Looking
at the recent holdings in Japan and the United States, for example,
L "Anzaand the aluminum wheels case, provides an illuminating contrast. In the aluminum wheels case,27 5 the court held that sales in

Germany exhausted Japanese patent rights because the first sale in
Germany adequately compensated the patentee and the provision of
an additional royalty merely for the goods crossing international borders to be unwarranted.276 In L "Anza,the court ruled that even a sale
within the United States need not exhaust U.S. copyrights when
goods were destined for sale at a lower price in another country.277 In

effect, a U.S. copyright never is exhausted by sales at prices below
U.S. prices. Thus, the courts in the aluminum wheels case and
L'Anza seem to agree that a reward-based test is the appropriate one,
but the courts reach different conclusions as to whether the test will
be satisfied under ordinary parallel import circumstances.278 In contrast to EU doctrine which is premised on the harm to consumers of
impairing the free movement of goods, the Japanese courts appear
concerned with the unjust enrichment of the patentee rather than
harm to consumers from allowing IP rights to facilitate horizontal
market division.
Across the three sets of law which this comment examines, there
274. See, e.g., case 15/74, Centrafarm

B.V. v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147 11,

[1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (1974); case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export,

1989 E.C.R. 79 T 11, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 413 (1989).
275.
276.

See supra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing case).
Id

277.
278.

Id.
The reasoning of the L'Anza court, whatever its merits jurisprudentially, was not well

matched to the facts of the case. The copyright in L'Anza involved the labels on bottles ofhair
care products. The court was construing the market price of the hair care product as synonymous with the value received for the copyright. While the value of a copy and the article
embodying it are probably identical in the case of, say a videotape, in the label context this

seems to be an unrealistic assumption. Just as the full value for the copyright in a bumper
sticker should not differ if it were being sold attached to a Mercedes or a Ford, the value of the

copyright in the label should not be affected by the market price for the shampoo. Yet this is
the basis of the court's holding. See supra notes 101- and accompanying text (discussing
L'Anza).
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are significant differences in how and why an intellectual property
right is exhausted by a first sale. Moreover, in some instances, such
as within the United States, there are clear differences across intellectual property doctrines and jurisdictions. These must obviously be
resolved as an incident to any movement towards international harmonization. While there may be legitimate policy reasons for particular differences across intellectual property doctrines,2 7 9 there are
inconsistent opinions as to the role such differences should play in
any ultimate harmonization. For example, cases like Holiday, Curtiss Aeroplane, and Primecrownbase their holdings either on the nature of the transfer of a chattel or policies in favor of free trade, while
cases like L'Anza and Ideal-Standardbase their holdings on fulfilling
the policy behind the intellectual property right. These, indeed,
would appear to be the proper policies to focus upon, but the absence
of a clear rationale internationally makes trade a perilous business. It
is precisely these discrepancies which must be confronted in order to
achieve a principled harmonization and lower trade barriers.
B. TerritorialEffect of a FirstSale
The use of intellectual property laws as a trade barrier is related
to the territory which is covered by the intellectual property right:
parallel imports may only be excluded from the territory where the
IPR is in effect. The scope of the territoriality of IPR is a central
element in the overall idea of exhaustion of rights. Whereas the previous section explored what characteristics must be present for a sale
to exhaust IPRs, territoriality answers the two other questions: where
a sale must occur in order to exhaust IPR and where those IPRs will
279. The evolution of EU cases would suggest that there would not be great differences.
For example the ECJ has held the following as the specific subject matters of intellectual property rights: for patents "to guarantee that the patentee has the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for the
first time, either directly or by the grant of licenses to third parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements." Cases 267-68/95, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Primecrown Ltd., I C.M.L.R.
83 30 (1997). For copyright, it includes the exclusive right of reproduction and first marketing of the work as well as the to oppose infringements. Case 341/87, EMI Electrola

GmbH v. Patricia Im-und Export, 1989 E.C.R. 79, [1989] 2 C.M.L.R. 413 (1989); Case
158/86, Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2521. For trademarks:

[IThe specific subject matter of the industrial property is the guarantee that the
owner of the trade mark has the exclusive right to use that trade mark, for the
purpose of putting products protected by the trade mark into circulation for the
first time, and is therefore intended to protect him against competitors wishing
to take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark by selling products illegally bearing that trade mark.
Case 16/74, Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183 8, [1974] C.M.L.R. 480
(1974).
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be exhausted.
Under EU law, the issue of territoriality is not one of nations but
one of a region - the area of the EU. The EU has primarily adopted
the principle of territoriality"0 and IPRs under the laws of Member
States are generally exhausted only by sales that occur within the
EU.28' The clearest rule is that sales outside the EU do not exhaust
the national rights throughout EU Member States." 2 The territoriality of Member States' IP laws has been called into some question
with respect to countries with which the EU shares a free-trade relationship. Polydor v. Harlequin Record Shops2 83 established that a
free-trade relationship with the EU did not mean that the principle of
exhaustion applied to products originating in such a country. However, some commentators suggest that when language of the free
trade agreement parallels that of Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty,
the ECJ might interpret such language as exhausting rights.2 The
ECJ has recently held that, under the Trademark Directive, 285 national
trademark rights are exhausted by sales outside Member States when:
(1) the product has been imported into another Member State by the
owner of the mark or another company in the same group as the
owner; (2) it was lawfully acquired in the Member State by an independent trader who exported into another Member State; (3) the
product has not been altered beyond what is needed to provide information needed under the legislation of the importing state, and (4)
the trademark rights in the exporting and importing Member States
are held by the same group.8 6

In contrast, under U.S. law there are no clear general rules.
With respect to patent rights, Sanofi held that a sale in France exhausted the U.S. patent rights,2"7 whereas Griffin held that a sale in
Italy did not exhaust the U.S. patentee's rights.288 While the cases are
280.
laws).
281.
282.
283.

But see supra note 231 (some nations hold international exhaustion under their
See supra PartIL
The ECJ held this inEMIv. CBS discussed supra note 136.
Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd and RSO Records, Inc. v. Harlequin Record Shops and

Simons Records Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 329, [1982] 1 C.M.L.R. 677 (1982).
284. Charles Worth, Free Trade Agreements and the Exhaustion of Rights Principle,16
EUPL INTELL. PRop. REv. 40 (1994).

285. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text (discussing directive).
286. See case C-352/95, Phytheron Int'l. SA v. Jean Bourdon SA, 1997 E.C.R. -cited in
Proceedingsof the Court of Justice and the Court of FirstInstance of the European Communities (visited Mar. 20, 1997) <http:lleuropa.eu.intlcj/en/act/9710en.htm#c-352/95>.
287. 565 F. Supp. 931, 939 (D.N.J. 1983).
288. 453 F. Supp. 1283, 1285-86 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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factually distinct, in that in Griffin parallel patents were held in the
exporting and importing state but not in Sanofi, the distinction, as a
theoretical matter, is irrelevant to the territorial extent of a U.S. patent. Griffin, a district court case, is in conflict with Curtiss Aeroplane,289 a circuit court case, which held that foreign and domestic
patents are exhausted upon the first sale, even when that sale is outside the United States. The backdrop of all these cases is Boesch v.
Graffl90 where the Supreme Court held that U.S. patent rights were
territorial. The best principle to synthesize these disparate holdings
is to examine whether the U.S. patentee received compensation for
the sale alleged to have exhausted its rights. In Sanofi and Curtiss
Aeroplane they clearly did, whereas in Boesch the patentee clearly
did not. Griffin does not assimilate neatly. In Griffin, it was an exclusive licensee who made the sale. While the U.S. patentee presumably received its bargained-for royalty, the court still held that
the U.S. rights were not exhausted under classic principles of territo29 1

riality.

Under U.S. copyright law, cases are similarly in conflict. The
statutory language giving rise to the conflict, "the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title.., is entitled without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord, 2' 92 has led
courts to inconsistent holdings on the territorial extent of U.S. copyrights. Specifically, it is not clear to the courts where a sale must
occur to exhaust U.S. copyright. Early interpretations construed the
language to mean that only articles manufactured and sold within the
Unites States were subject to exhaustion,2 93 and influential commentators agreed.294 At least one recent case rejects this and holds that
under § 109(a) a sale abroad exhausts U.S. copyright.2 95 Others have
289. 266 F. 71, 77-79 (2d Cir. 1920).
290. 133 U.S. 697, 702-703 (1890).
291. The plaintiffs action is premised in the final analysis not on wrongs done to
the three composting machines covered by United States patents but rather on
invasions of his rights under those patent ....The sale or use of each machine in both countries represents potentially two separate torts against the
plaintiff and infringes potentially on two separate sets of rights held by
him ....
Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283, 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
292. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988).

293.

Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Scorpio Music Distrib., 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa.

1983), affd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984)
294. NIMMER, supranote 90.

295.
1988).

Sebastian Int'l v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1099 (3d Cir.
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reached the opposite conclusion and interpreted § 602(a) as giving
296
the right of § 106(3) (which § 109 limits) extraterritorial scope.
Finally, the most recent case from the Ninth Circuit held, in effect,
that notions of territoriality are irrelevant in this context, with the
relevant concern being whether the first sale was one for full value. 297
Under U.S. trademark law, on the other hand, in what territory
the first sale occurred is not directly relevant to whether the U.S.
mark holder has a right to stop parallel imports. If the goods are
genuine in that they bear the mark with the authority of the mark
holder, and the sale was made by the U.S. mark holder or one under
common control, where the sale occurred does not matter; the U.S.
trademark rights are exhausted.298 While older cases such as Katzel
reflected judicial adherence to the principle of territoriality, this has
largely been superseded by the Supreme Court's holding in K Mart
with respect to § 526 of the Tariff Act and circuit court opinions
which have limited Katzel to its particular set of equities.299 Paradoxically, U.S. trademark rights are still clearly territorial in the
context of use sufficient to confer protection.3"'
296. See BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991).
297. L'Anza Research Int'l., Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th
Cir. 1996).
Generally U.S. copyright law will not be applied extraterritorially against alleged infringers. See Subaftlms, Ltd. v. MGM-Panthe CommunicationsCo., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir.
1994) (citing cases). While, a priori, this might appear to be a useful body of decisions to
interpret whether extraterritorial acts exhaust rights under § 109, its applicability is likely
limited. The reasons for not applying U.S. law extraterritorially flow from the fact that all
nations are sovereign and were the United States to proscribe conduct which a different sovereign either explicitly or implicitly allows, the concept of sovereignty would be rendered
meaningless. See generallyRESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 400-403 (1995). The
question of whether extraterritorial sales can exhaust U.S. copyright does not implicate the
affront to the sovereignty of other nations that proscribing conduct does. Rather it is simply
the question of whether an event that takes place outside the United States can determine
whether copyright exists with respect to a work or copy. This notion that has been part of U.S.
copyright law for years. For example, even the current U.S. copyright law denies protection to
most works which are published abroad before in the United States in a nation that is not in a
treaty relationship with the United States. See 1 NIMmER, supra note 90, § 5.05.
298. See K mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281 (1988); Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc., v.
Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
299. See NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, Inc., 810 F.2d 1506, 1510 (9th Cir.1987)
(limiting application of Katzel to cases with the same equities as Katzel); Olympus Corp. v.
United States, 792 F.2d 315, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1986) (limiting Katzel to its "special facts");
Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc., v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
300. Person's Co., Ltd. v. Catherine Chirstman, 900 F.2d 1565 (Fed.Cir. 1990) (Japanese
prior use insufficient to confer U.S. priority right). The Lanham Act has also been interpreted
to have a broad extraterritorial reach. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952);
Scotch Whisky Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973); American Rice,
Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Co-op Ass'n., 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983).
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The dearth of Japanese decisional law in the area makes firm
conclusions difficult in the area of territoriality. The aluminum
wheels case clearly indicates that extraterritorial sales can exhaust
Japanese patent rights. Moreover, the ParkerPen case and the Tariff
Act" 1 suggest a similar principle applies to trademark rights. This
aligns Japanese law more closely with U.S. law than EU law, but the
clear holding that sales anywhere in the world exhaust parallel Japanese patents is likely not the law in the United Siates, while it clearly
is the law in the EU for intra-EU sales.
The territorial reach of IPR relates to the exhaustion principle in
two ways. First, it defines the scope of the rights that will be exhausted if exhaustion occurs. In this aspect, EU law is the broadest,
exhausting national IP rights regionally.3°2 Under NAFTA,33 signatories ensure "that measures to enforce intellectual property rights do
not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade." 3° The provisions relating to the border measures for intellectual property are silent with respect to parallel imports. 3°5 The language quoted above is
weaker than the EU's Article 30 which provides, "[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect
shall.., be prohibited between Member States." Nonetheless, an
argument can be made that for the same reasons LPRs are regionally
exhausted in the EU, regional exhaustion is appropriate under
NAFTA. This author is aware of no case that has reached such a
conclusion, and when U.S. IPRs are exhausted, they are only ex301.

See supra note 237 and accompanying text (discussing Tariff Act amendment).

302.

The Community Trade Mark and the proposed Community Patent would similarly

share in being regionally exhausted, but are regionally and not nationally based. See supra
notes 165-173 and accompanying text (discussing Community Trade Mark and proposed
Community Patent).
303. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.

289.
304. Id. § 1701(1).
305.

Id § 1718:

Each Party shall, in conformity with this Article, adopt procedures to enable a
right holder, who has valid grounds for suspecting that the importation of
counterfeit trademark goods or pirated copyright goods may take place, to lodge
an application in writing with its competent authorities, whether administrative

or judicial, for the suspension by the customs administration of the release of
such goods into free circulation. No Party shall be obligated to apply such procedures to goods in transit. A Party may permit such an application to be made

in respect of goods that involve other infringements of intellectual property
rights, provided that the requirements of this Article are met. A Party may also
provide for corresponding procedures concerning the suspension by the customs
administration of the release of infringing goods destined for exportation from

its territory.
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hausted in territories reached by U.S. IP laws.
The second way territoriality relates to exhaustion is in determining where a sale must occur to exhaust an IP right. Again, here
EU law is relatively clear and consistent: only sales within EU member states regionally exhaust IP rights, and this holds true for patents,
trademarks, and copyrights.306 There is considerably more disagreement across - and even within - intellectual property rights in the
United States. 30 7 While less developed, Japanese law is relatively
clear at least with respect to patents and trademarks, that an authorized sale anywhere in the world can exhaust parallel Japanese IP
rights. 30 8 Understanding the territorial extent of IPRs is an obvious
prerequisite to formulating an intelligent mechanism for harmonization. As the forgoing has shown, there is no clarity, on an international level, as to the extent of IP laws in this context. This not only
motivates the need for harmonization further, but also provides a focal point for harmonization to begin.
VI. MOVING TOWARDs HARMONIZATION

As the preceding section illustrates, from a doctrinal and practical perspective, there is a need for harmonization of the exhaustion of
rights principle. The legal quagmire has practical consequences.
For example, the holder of a patent to a pharmaceutical may
prevent parallel trade from entering the United States from Italy, but
the patent holder in the United Kingdom cannot. Another example is
that parallel trade of copyrighted phonorecords can occur from Portugal to France, but not from the Philippines to the United States.
Also, the holder of a patent to an object made in the United States
cannot, based on patent rights, prevent reimportation of the object,
but it could stop reimport if it held the copyright to the object, depending on which circuit controls. The same patent holder, holding
the rights to the trademark that the object bears, may or may not be
able to block reimport based on trademark rights, depending on
whether the overseas marketer is under common control of the mark
holder.
The current state of the exhaustion of rights principle internationally is uncertain and ambiguous and the practical results of the
fractured state of the law probably makes little sense to commercial
traders. These same practical problems have motivated other efforts
306.
307.
308.

See supra Part III.
Seesupra Part II.
Seesupra PartlV.
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at international harmonization. The moves towards the international
harmonization of intellectual property laws is clear and growing.
Among the most influential of these efforts has been the TRIPs 0 9
agreement concerning trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights. While it cannot be denied that parallel trade and the exhaustion of rights principle are trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, the TRIPs agreement failed to confront the issue. Article
6 of TRIPs provides: "For the purposes of dispute settlement under
this Agreement,... nothing shall be used to address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights." 310 - This failure to confront a
fundamentally trade-related aspect of intellectual property rights was
a glaring omission in light of the policy stated in the TRIPs preamble
of "[d]esiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights."'I
A. HarmonizationModels
A coherent international harmonization is necessary to meet the
twin goals of adequately protecting intellectual property and reducing
impediments to trade. However, this leaves open the question of
what form the harmonization should take.
1. National Exhaustion
One possible step towards harmonization would be to adopt the
rule internationally that IPRs are only exhausted in the territory of the
granting state and only by initial transfers within that state. There are
both strengths and weaknesses to this approach. The most obvious
deficiency is that a rule based on national borders as the standard of
harmonization would be inconsistent with the fundamental principles
of international harmonization which is to break down this type of
national division for allocating substantive rights.
A second problem with national exhaustion lies is accommodating regional trading areas such as the EU. Certainly, to comport
with EU doctrine, there would have to be a provision for regional
rather national exhaustion. With the rise of other trading areas such

309.

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994,

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [herinafter TRIPs Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTmUMEmNs-RsuLTs O THE URUGUAY RotmN vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81,
art. 6 (1994).
310.

Id.art.6.

311.

Trips Agreement, supra note 309.
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as NAFTA3 12 and MERCOSUR, national intellectual property rights
may be growing less important, and as regional trading areas arise, it
is quite likely that they will follow the EU model and need regional
exhaustion.
Finally, at least at present, the weight of international opinion
appears to be against mere national/regional exhaustion. At the 1996
W.I.P.O. Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, the United States proposed an importation
right be added to the Berne Protocol which would have provided for
national or regional exhaustion. 13 This proposal was objected to by a
coalition led by the delegations of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 314 and does not appear in the final treaty. Thus, at least under
copyright law, there is international opposition to mere national exhaustion.
2. International Exhaustion
On the opposite pole from national exhaustion is harmonization
around the principle of international exhaustion. Under this model,
authorized sales in any nation would exhaust all parallel IP rights
with respect to that item throughout the world. While this option is
perhaps the most theoretically appealing in its simplicity, it does not
seem to be a feasible option at present. This option, while most
beneficial to consumers, would be opposed by IP rights holders. It
has a greater impact on their profitability than national exhaustion by
312. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing possible language in NAFTA
which would provide a legal basis for regional exhaustion).
313. The proposed language was:

(I) Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing:

(i) the making available to the public of the original and copies of their works
through sale or other transfer of ownership;
(ii) the importation of the original and copies of their works, even following any

sale or other transfer of ownership of the original or copies by or pursuant to
authorization
(2) National legislation of a Contracting Party may provide that the right provided for in paragraph (1)(i) does not apply to distribution of the original or any
copy of any work that has been sold or the ownership of which has been otherwise transferred in that Contracting Party's territory by or pursuant to authorization.

Memorandum prepared by the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on the Basic Proposal
for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, (Aug. 30, 1996)
<http://www.wipo.intleng/diplconf/4dcall.htm>.

314. Amendment to Article 8 of Draft Treaty No. 1 and Articles 9 and 16 of Draft Treaty
No.2, (Dec. 13, 1996) <http://www.wipo.intleng/diplconf/distrib/76de.htm>.
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frustrating attempts to use exclusive rights to coordinate a transnational system of monopoly pricing which maximizes international
profit.
In addition, the proposal put forward by the U.S. delegation at
the W.I.P.O. conference indicates that the U.S. delegation opposed
international exhaustion. If the proposal was a true reflection of the
U.S. position, given the prominent role the United States plays in
international intellectual property fora, then international exhaustion
faces strong opposition.
3. Selective International Exhaustion by Product Class
A third option is a hybrid of the two options mentioned above.
Under this type of exhaustion, certain classes of products would be
subject to international exhaustion while others would be subject to
only national exhaustion. Such a position has been investigated by
the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry." 5 One
option considered was to authorize parallel trade of products such as
compact discs and watches but bar parallel imports of products such
as industrial machinery and electrical goods. 316 At least on a superficial level this would improve competition in the market for consumer
goods. Producer prices would still be buoyed up however.
This system does have the distinct benefits. First, it allows the
flexibility to respond to particular situations which may for policy
reasons need protection. In the case of patents or copyrights, a particular type of invention or writing may need more of an incentive to
create; in the case of a trademark, a particular type of product may be
more susceptible to consumer confusion.
4. Rule of Reason Exhaustion Model
Another possible model for exhaustion is to set as the default
rule international exhaustion with the possibility of allowing a plaintiff wishing to oppose parallel importation to prove that legitimate
reasons exist for their IPR to not have been exhausted by a prior sale,
i.e., so that the parallel imports can be stopped. This is essentially
the position which has evolved under the ECJ's jurisprudence interpreting Articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty. This notion has found
its way into several EU intellectual property harmonization docu-

315. MITI to Study Parallel Imports to See if Regulations are Needed, Pat. Trademark &
Copyright Daily (BNA) (Oct. 28, 1991).
316. Id.

500

COMPUTER & IIGHTECIINOLOGYLAWJOURN'AL [Vol. 13

ments 7 The inquiry under this model would be whether the right
holder, one authorized by him, or one under common economic control exercised the economic right which the IPR was designed to afford. If they did, then with respect to that article their IPR would be
internationally exhausted unless the complaining party proved that
the policies underlying free trade and the IPRs at issue would be
frustrated by allowing further distribution. Examples where such
policies might be frustrated could include: likely decrease in economic welfare of the affected parties, 318 a likelihood of consumer
source confusion in the case of trademarks, or, in the case of a patent
or copyright, a showing that the presence of parallel trade so decreases the economic incentives to authors and inventors that creation
of the type of work involved would likely be decreased substantially.
The strength of such a model of harmonization is its ability to
accommodate many interests. On the one hand, it has as a default
rule international exhaustion which is both theoretically appealing
and most vigorously promotes free trade and movement of goods.
On the other hand, it affords intellectual property owners -acting
through their governments if necessary -the ability to prevent the
exhaustion of their IP rights when circumstances warrant it in light of
the policies of intellectual property rights and free trade in goods and
services.
The flexibility that confers these benefits is also the most significant deficiency. In order for any harmonization under such a
principle to be genuine, it would necessitate consistent and uniform
decision making in determining when it is appropriate not to apply
the default rule. In addition, the fact that it is not a bright-line rule
would tend to foster disputes.
In addition to the jurisprudential and procedural strengths and
weaknesses the welfare effects of the different legal regimes ought to
317. See Agreement Relating to Community Patents, Dec. 15, 1989, 1989 O.J. 401, art.
28:
The rights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to acts concerning
a product covered by that patent which are done within the territories of the
Contracting States after that product has been put on the market in one of these
States by the proprietor of the patent or with his express consent, unless there
are grounds which under Community law, would justify the extension to such
acts ofthe rights conferred by the patent.
See also supra note 196 (text of Council Regulation on the Community trade mark relating to
exhaustion of rights).
318. See infra Part VI.B (describing the potentially harmful effects on world welfare by
allowing parallel trade). It is such a situation which is contemplated as an example where the
policies of free trade - increased consumer and producer welfare - would be frustrated.
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be considered. The exhaustion of rights doctrine and the parallel
trade that it creates have complicated economic effects, not only directly upon the trading parties, but also indirectly due to the potential
responses of sellers trying to combat parallel trade in contravention
of their marketing plan. These larger effects are easily overlooked by
courts adjudicating the dispute between the parties before them.
However, as the following Part illustrates, these effects are most instructive in selection an appropriate model for harmonization of the
exhaustion of rights doctrine. A primer on the economic concepts
used in the following discussion appears as an appendix for those
desiring background information.
B. Economics of ParallelTrade
Parallel imports are of concern to sellers of goods because of the
effect they have on profitability. The interests of many other parties
are affected by a simple parallel goods transaction, though. First,
producers in the source country are confronted with supranormal demand for the article. 3 9 As a result, consumers in the source country
are confronted with higher prices 320 as the market equilibrates to accommodate this excess demand. The trader itself stands to earn a
profit by consummating the trade. Finally, consumers in the destination country benefit by the reduced prices.
1. National Welfare and Parallel Trade
The effect of exhaustion of rights law on welfare can be examined by comparing welfare under uniform and discriminatory pricing
regimes. The cause of the discriminatory pricing affects the analysis.
There is evidence that monopolistic price discrimination is a cause of
the conditions supporting parallel trade, 321 so this must be considered.
Legal regimes which bar parallel trade allow the price discrimination
to be maintained and legal acceptance of parallel trade de facto imposes nearly-uniform prices across markets.
Monopolistic price discrimination implies that prices will be

319. They are in effect supplying part of the demand of consumers both in their territory
and the destination territory.
320. At least in the short term.

321. See Maleug and Schwartz, supra note 7, at 174 (citing sources and drawing conclusion). See also case C 267-268/95, Merck v. Primecrown, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83 (1996); case
187/80, Merck v. Stephar, [1981] E.C.R. 2063, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 463 (1981). The patent
context is the best theoretical fit. Patents have the potential to convey significant market

power, particularly in pharmaceuticals.
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higher in markets with insensitive demand conditions.322 For example, if demand in the United States for a toy 32 is relatively insensitive
to changes in price when compared to Spain, monopoly pricing implies that the price charged would be higher in the United States, thus
creating the conditions for parallel trade. Ordinarily, U.S. consumers
would be adversely affected by this situation because consumers in
nations with low elasticity markets are harmed by the prohibition of
parallel trade and would prefer the uniform price.324 Conversely,
Spanish consumers would prefer the barring of parallel trade. 325
Were the producer to choose a uniform price across all markets it
would mean higher prices in their market and, given their greater
sensitivity to price changes, this would have more significant welfare-reducing effects.32s
The foregoing was premised on the producer not choosing to cut
off the source market completely rather than suffer the uniform pricing with parallel trade. Elimination of price discrimination may decrease welfare if markets are closed.327 When an entire market is
foreclosed in this fashion, it is clearly to the great detriment of the
consumers in that market. This insight underlies a key result: monopolistic price discrimination reduces welfare if it does not increase
total output. 328 Thus, the law of parallel trade creates a dilemma.
Allowing international exhaustion of intellectual property runs the
risk of causing markets to be foreclosed and barring it will not even
increase welfare unless total output increases.
2. World Welfare and Parallel Trade
Courts and legislatures ordinarily justify whatever exhaustion of
rights regime they establish in part on the fact that it will serve the
interests of some domestic constituency. 329 However, as was seen in
322.

JEAN TIROLE, THmTHEORY OF INDUSTRAL ORGANIZATION 137 (1992).

323. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1987) (Cabbage Patch Kids dolls with "adoption" certificates in Spanish which were not
accepted by U.S. doll adoption agency materially differed).
324. TiROLE, supranote 322, at 137-38.
325. Id.
326. That is the greater responsiveness of the quantity demanded to price implies that the

consumer surplus from the market is more significantly impacted.
327.

TiROLE, supranote 322, at 139.

328. Id. at 138.
329. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 526 (1988) (U.S. trademark law); A. Boujois & Co., Inc. v.
Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) (nationality of trademarks); EMI Records v. CBS, [1976] E.C.R.
811, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 235 (1976); NAOKO, supra note 245, at 270-71 (discussing aluminum

wheels case where the Japanese court allowed parallel trade in part for consumer's benefit);
L'Anza Research Int'l., Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996) (U.S.
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the preceding sections, laws in a destination country either permitting
or preventing parallel trade have economic effects in the (actual or
prospective) source countries. When parallel trade is prevented, domestic sellers are being conferred the benefit of supracompetitive
profits, while sellers in prospective source countries suffer the cost of
the opportunity to supply the parallel trader. Yet, consumers in a
prospective source country reap the benefits of lower prices. Conversely, if parallel trade is allowed, uniform pricing may be instituted
internationally to prevent parallel trade and this may result in markets
not being served.33 ° Any attempt at harmonizing parallel trade law
internationally ought then to consider the effects on world welfare of
different regimes.
a. The Effect of Uniform Pricingon World Welfare
Demand for products such as pharmaceuticals, 33' perfume, 332 and
consumer luxuries 333 varies widely across nations. When demand in
a source and destination nation differ widely,334 and parallel imports
are allowed, the seller of the traded good faces a decision. If the
seller lowers its prices sufficiently to compete in the low demand
market, a parallel trader will reimport to the high demand market,
undercut the price there and competition will eventually equilibrate
the prices across markets. 335 As an alternative to this low uniform
price - the price in the low demand country - a seller could choose
to not sell in the low demand country at all or only at a uniform price
close to what it can charge in high demand market. This will result
in the closing of markets.
Uniform pricing thus has the potential to harm world welfare if
it results in the closing of a substantial number of markets. A uniform price will close a market when at that price no sales will be
made.336 Such situations arise when the demand conditions are so
disparate between rich and poor countries that setting a profit maxicourt barring parallel trade because of copyright holder's right to supracompetitive profits).
330. Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 171, 175-183.
331. See Merck v. Primecrown, Case C 267-268/95, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83 (1996).

332.

See Parfums Givenchy v. Drug Emporium, 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994).

333.

See Societe des Produits Nestle S.A. v. Casa Helvetia Inc., 982 F.2d 633 (1st Cir.

1992).
334. Assume, as is generally the case, that demand is higher in the destination nation.
335. Factoring in transportation costs and other costs created by parallel trade.
336. The statement that no sales will be made should not be taken too literally. The point
here is that in some markets, sales for a particular product -say PERUGINA chocolatesmay be so low at the uniform price that it will not be worth the cost to set up operations to

serve the market at all.
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mizing price in the relatively wealthy (higher demand) nation results
in no sales in the relatively poor (lower demand) nation. When demand dispersion is high enough across nations, world welfare may be
higher if parallel trade is blocked, i.e., no exhaustion of rights, and
monopolistic price discrimination allowed in each nation.337 This is
because the welfare-decreasing effects of price discrimination are
dwarfed by the total loss of welfare in the closed markets.
b. The Effect ofNonunifonn Pricingon World
Welfare
Nonuniform pricing -

international price discrimination -

will

harm consumers in high demand countries even if it were to improve
overall world welfare. 338 Nonuniform pricing would allow manufacturing concerns in high demand countries to reap a benefit though.
The ability to price above a competitive price allows for supranormal
profits to be earned, thus increasing the welfare of the owners of
those manufacturing in the particular industry. A further effect of
nonuniform pricing lies in its transfer of welfare across national borders. When nonuniform pricing is allowed, consumers in relatively
wealthy countries feel the brunt of the welfare-decreasing effects of
price discrimination because they will ordinarily have a higher willingness to pay; on the other hand, consumers in relatively poor countries benefit.339 Finally, within a country, preventing the competitive
pricing of the parallel trader allows a vendor to raise price. This will
cause a transfer of welfare from consumers to producers within that
country.340 Thus, the effects of nonuniform pricing are numerous.

The relative magnitudes of particular effects makes reliance on these
effects alone an inadequate basis for choosing among different exhaustion models. However, where these effects coincide with sound
policy bases and other economic results, such as those in the next
Part, they aid in guiding the choice of the appropriate harmonization
model.
c. TradingBlocks
The forgoing has shown that the interests of various groups conflict when intellectual property rights are / are not internationally exhausted. Fundamentally, consumers in wealthy countries are harmed
337.

See Malueg & Schwatz, supra note 7, at 178-80. See also, supra note 328 and ac-

companying text (price discrimination can only improve welfare if it increases output).
338.

Malueg and Schwarz, supranote 7, at 176-81.

339. Id.
340. See TiROLE, supra note 366, at 137, 65-78.
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by barring parallel trade, and consumers in poor countries may be
harmed if parallel trade is allowed and producers' response results in
the closing of markets. A possible welfare-redeeming solution to this
conundrum is the establishment of trading blocks.3 41 Assume it were
known what countries' markets would be closed if parallel trade were
allowed. Form a first trading block of these countries and a second
trading block of all others. If parallel trade were allowed within each
of these trading blocks, but not between them, welfare would be improved.342 Those in the first trading block will be served at the lower
prices which would have been optimal for producers had parallel
trade been allowed.343 Consumers in the second trading block will
still get many of the competitive benefits of parallel trade because the
relatively poorest nation in this block can sill function as a source for
parallel trade.3 "
Such a scheme, while theoretically promising has many practical limitations. Within a nation, individual product markets may, or
may not, be likely to be foreclosed but such markets are clumped together when nations get together to form a trading block.345 The less
focused conglomeration of nations which political arrangements create may still have beneficial effects, though, as economic modeling
shows that the international welfare benefits of trading blocks are
relatively easy to reap.'
C. Harmonization
The economic results are instructive on the proper form of harmonization. The most prominent insights from the economic analyses are the welfare benefits of an international exhaustion regime in
the absence of market foreclosure and the significant welfaredepressing consequences were foreclosure to occur on a large scale.
In this light, all of the harmonization principles mentioned have
341.

Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 185-89.

342. See id.
343. Id.
344.

This nation can be considered as the nation whose demand is "just strong enough" to

not been be closed by uniform pricing. Thus the price at which goods would be sold here is

"close" to those in markets that would be closed and can provide price pressure in wealthy
nations via parallel trade. Merck v. Primecrown can be seen as such as situation. The EC is
the trading block, the nations of Spain and Portugal, new entrants to the EC, are on the lowest
end of the wealth spectrum in this trading block.
345. Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 7 at 184-89.
346. Id. at 185-87. Malueg & Schwartz also report that trading blocks with "holes" in

them-blocks which do not represent all points on the wealth continuum but rather have
gaps-can be even more effective. Id at 188-89.
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some redeeming features. Those which favor a broader sweep of exhaustion can legitimately claim improved social welfare through the
more efficient working of markets. Those which favor a more narrow sweep can claim a mechanism to assure the potentially dangerous effects of market foreclosure will be prevented. Two of the proposed harmonization principles provide an option of offering both.
Both selective international exhaustion by product class and a
rule of reason based international exhaustion provide a baseline level
of free international trade. Each also maintains the flexibility to allow parallel trade to be blocked in particular instances if market foreclosure was likely or it was appropriate in light of the policies of IPR
and the good traded. The main difference in pursuing one form
rather than the other is efficiency in decision making. To adopt selective international exhaustion by product class would place a responsibility on some international trade or IP administrative authority
to determine product classifications which are needed to be exempted
from the general rule of international exhaustion. This decision
would have to be made on a pairwise relationship between trading
states because whether there was a likelihood of market foreclosure
depends on the particular combination of the product or service and
the importing state. That is, it may be appropriate to be concerned
about the Mexican market being foreclosed to certain pharmaceuticals, but it would be unlikely that the U.S. market would be foreclosed.
The rule of reason based harmonization model would distribute
this decision making to the producing and consuming public. Only
upon application to the appropriate tribunal would the question arise
whether an exception to the general rule of international exhaustion
will be granted. From a resource allocation perspective, this distributed decision making is desirable. The potential problem lies in the
ability of decision making tribunal to intelligently reach such a determination. As the previous sections revealed, the determination of
whether a particular exemption to the general rule of international
exhaustion should be granted would be a fact-intensive market analysis. Of necessity, this analysis would need to consider demand conditions in the potentially foreclosed markets, the cost structure of the
relevant industries, and related questions.
These requirements drive the selection of the proper forum for
making this determination. The exhaustion of rights problem is one
both of international trade and of intellectual property. As such, both
the World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("W.I.P.O.") are logical candidates. If a competent fo-
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rum exists for efficiently making the needed determinations , the rule
of reason model would be the preferred approach to harmonization.
The W.I.P.O. Arbitration and Mediation Center offers four dispute resolution procedures: mediation, arbitration, expedited arbitration, and mediation followed (in the absence of settlement) by arbitration.34 7 In addition, W.I.P.O. is preparing a treaty for the settlement of intellectual property disputes among nations.348 The
W.I.P.O. does have the advantage of being able to draw on a considerable group of experts in national intellectual property laws,349 and
state entities which would, of necessity, be parties to the determination, are proper parties for W.I.P.O. dispute resolution if they express
the proper assent.35 0 However, unless and until such a treaty establishes a competent forum for making the needed determination, it is
unlikely that other resources available from W.I.P.O. will be adequate. First, W.I.P.O.'s dispute resolution services are primarily designed to handle bilateral contractual disputes. 5 1 Of the services they
provide only arbitration has any binding force. While this could
prove adequate if the appropriate customs agency of the destination
state were a party, it lacks any formal mechanism for national participation in, and enforcement of, the determination process and any
a workable appellate mechanism. Moreover, and perhaps more fundamentally, because the W.I.P.O. "is responsible for the promotion of
the protection of intellectual property throughout the world," 352 it
may be ill-situated for the required task for two reasons. First, the
difficult inquiry will be one primarily of trade-related and economic
issues,353 not one of substantive intellectual property law. Second, as
an institution whose traditional role has been the increasing of protection for intellectual property, 354 W.I.P.O. does not possess among
its constituents the consumers of intellectual property in the various
states and merchants who trade in gray market goods. Yet these in347. W.I.P.O. Arbitration and Mediation Center, The Center and Its Services in More
Detail (visisted Mar. 11, 1997) <http://www.wipo.orgleng/arbitlservicesservices.html
#dispute>.
348. W.I.P.O., Other Activities (visited April, 22 1997) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/gen-

eral/other.htm>.
349.
350.
351.
352.

See W.I.P.O. Arbitration and Mediation Center supra note 347.
Id.
Seeid.
World Intellectual Property Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization

(visited April, 22 1997) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/dgtext.htm>.
353.

See supra Part VI.B. (describing issues of supply and demand in source and destina-

tion countries and the possibility of market foreclosure as most relevant inquiries).
354. See, e.g., Berne Convention, July 24, 1971, S.TasR, Doc. No. 99-27.
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terests are, as noted in Part VI.B, significantly impacted by exhaustion of rights law. The inability for these impacted groups to play an
equal institutional role in the W.I.P.O. leaves it currently lacking as
an appropriate international forum for determining questions of the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") provides an alternative
forum. The WTO has established dispute resolution procedures, both
with respect to traditional trade subjects such as subsidies, and countervailing measures355 and intellectual property matters.356 As noted
above,357 the TRIPs agreement failed to adequately address the ex-

haustion of rights issue. It is a purpose of the comment to point out
that the exhaustion of rights doctrine needs to be harmonized. Once
harmonized, the technical and institutional resources of the WTO
make it the preferred international forum for making the type of determinations which a rule of reason harmonization of exhaustion of
rights law would require. Article 64 of TRIPs358 incorporates the
Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") of the GATT. 359 The
DSU provides an extensive dispute settlement procedure. 36 1 Most
importantly, it provides the type of institutional procedures and expertise sufficient to handle the task. The WTO by its very nature, has
familiarity with the types of economic and market analyses which
may be needed in determining whether an exception is appropriate
under a rule of reason harmonization of the exhaustion of rights doctrine.3 61 The DSU also has an established mechanism for dealing
with multiple parties to a dispute which would increase the efficiency
of the procedure for an intellectual property right holder's perspec363
tive,362 and a procedure for the appeal of dispute panel decisions.
One of the drawbacks of the GATT procedure is that there is no
concrete deadline for a nation to implement the decision of a dispute
355. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, April 15, 1994, Mar-

rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement],
Annex I A, LEGM. INsrRuMems- RRsuLrs OF Ta URUGUAY RounD VOL. 31, 33 I.L.M. 27 (1994).
356. See supra note 309 Annex IC.
357. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
358. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 309, art. 64.

359.

Dispute Settlement Understanding, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-

lishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter DSU Agreement], Annex IA, LEGAL IN.
sTRUMENTs- RSUTs oF a URUGUAY RouNt VOL. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).

360. See id. arts. 6-23.
361. See id. art. 8 (composition of panels for dispute resolution to be from "well qualified" members of either the public or private sector).
362. Id. arts. 9-10.
363.

Id art. 17.
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resolution panel. Article XXII:2 of the GATT provides that the appropriate changes be made within a "reasonable period" but this has
not been further defined. However, if a government fails to implement a panel or appellate recommendation in order to bring national
law in conformity-here the blocking of parallel trade-the government must negotiate with the complainant with respect to acceptable compensation.3" For intellectual property rights holders this
provides a better enforcement mechanism than that present under
available W.I.P.O. alternatives. New institutions and structures will
undoubtedly need to be created to implement a rule of reason harmonization of the exhaustion of rights doctrine, as well as revision of
national laws where necessary. However, the mechanisms available
through the GATT dispute resolution procedure make it an able and
preferable forum.
The rule of reason exhaustion model is therefore procedurally
and substantively the most desirable. It is the conclusion of this
comment that international harmonization of the exhaustion of rights
principle should be attempted with this model as the starting point.
In summary, first, this model reflects the economic insight that the
nonexhaustion of intellectual property rights allows appreciable welfare-decreasing effects through international price discrimination.
Second, if has the flexibility to prevent the possibly even greater welfare-decreasing harm from the foreclosure of markets by allowing
intellectual property owners or potentially-impacted consumers to act
to prevent the exhaustion of the intellectual property rights preventing parallel trade. Third, it is doctrinally the most appealing
in that it couples the most theoretically sound harmonization model,
international exhaustion, with the ability to have all parties impacted
by exhaustion of rights law choices - intellectual property rights
holders, consumers in the impacted nations, and traders - participate
in the process for determining when non-exhaustion is appropriate.
Fourth, it easily accommodates the establishment of the particular
exhaustion regimes to reap the welfare benefits from trading blocks.
Finally, as noted above, there currently exists an able and well developed international structure in the WTO's dispute resolution for implementation of the least-appealing aspect of the rule of reason
model, determination of when exceptions to the default rule are appropriate.

364. Id. art. 21.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

The exhaustion of rights doctrine is one of the most fundamental
limitations on intellectual property rights. Yet, as this comment has
shown, there is considerable disagreement among the major trading
nations as to whether, and when, intellectual property rights will be
exhausted. This has spawned abundant litigation and frustrated both
intellectual property right holders and parallel traders. As trade in
intellectual property grows, the differing views internationally on the
exhaustion of rights doctrine will become an even larger burden on
the free trade among nations. The failure to appreciably begin the
harmonization of the exhaustion of rights doctrine in the WTO and
the W.I.P.O. needs to be remedied in a deliberate and thoughtful
manner taking into account the economic welfare of all parties potentially affected by the legal choices made. Among the models
available for harmonization of the exhaustion of rights doctrine, few
have the flexibility to protect the legitimate interests of those impacted by exhaustion of rights law. It is the position of this comment
that the model that best protects these interests is one which allows
for free trade in goods with the availability of exceptions where warranted in light of the economics of the trading situation and the policies of IPRs. 361 While procedurally more burdensome than "brightline" options, it best allows balancing of the competing interests. To
implement the procedures necessary it is further suggested that international trade fora, in particular the WTO, be chosen rather than international intellectual property fora, such as the W.I.P.O. While
much work still needs to be done to create the details of a working
system of harmonized exhaustion of rights law, the problem is by no
means insurmountable. Through the cooperation of intellectual
property rights owners, trading interests, and consumer groups, a
workable solution can be found.

365.

See supra Part VI.A.4 (describing rule of reason harmonization model).
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APPENDIX A

The following provides background information on the economic concepts discussed in Part VI.B of the text.
A. FundamentalIdeas
A key economic concept underlying parallel imports is price
discrimination. 366 In this context it refers to the fact that the parallel
traded good is priced differently in the source and destination country. Arbitrage refers to the practice of buying a good and reselling it
for a profit. 367 The parallel trader is the arbitrageur, buying the article
at a lower price in the source market and selling it at a higher one in
the destination market. An important issue for the producer of the
traded article in determining the price at which to sell it is the elasticity of demand. This refers to how responsive the quantity demanded is to an incremental change in price. The more the quantity
demanded changes when price changes an incremental amount, the
more elastic demand is termed. Conversely, when even large
changes in price do not significantly change the quantity demanded,
demand is termed inelastic. Pharmaceuticals are a typical example of
prescribed amount is typically
a good with inelastic demand: the
368
price.
the
of
irrespective
purchased
The common resource or free-rider problem is commonly
charged by producers of parallel traded goods. The problem generally refers to a situation where several different parties may use a
resource without adequate means of excluding would-be users or assuring recompense for the resource consumed. In this context the
charge is made that the seller in the destination country has expended
money in promoting the traded product or in providing other serv366. I am using the term here in a descriptive sense. See, e.g., JEAN TROLE, THE THEORY OF
INoDUSTRAL ORGANIZATION 133 ("Roughly it can be said that the producer price-discriminates
when two units of the same physical good are sold at different prices, either to the same consumer or to different consumers."). The term as I use it is not limited to the monopoly practice

of market division with monopoly pricing in each market. While this use is properly seen as
price discrimination, and indeed may be an explanation for parallel trade, I use the term to
describe the market condition of the same good being sold at different prices. Note that this
condition may arise for innocuous reasons, e.g., timber felled in Alaska may cost more in
Florida because of the cost of transport. Formally, this may not be the same good, however for

the purposes of this paper I will ignore this formality because to the parties concerned it is the
essentially the same good.
367. Generally arbitrage refers to the ability to turn a risklessprofit. The unsettled law of
parallel trade makes the riskless part questionable in this context.

368. See supra Parts II1.C & D (describing exhaustion of rights law in EU which has
frequently involved parallel trade in pharmaceuticals).
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ices, such as technical support, and these additional expenditures result in higher costs for the item in the destination country. The parallel trader is claimed to be a free-rider on the developed goodwill or
additional services provided when it purchases in a marketpresumably one where these additional expenditures are not made and resells in a market where prices are higher because of these additional investments. 69
B. Primeron Welfare Economics
Welfare in the economic sense refers to the benefits which accrue to both producers and consumers in a market. Looking at the
group of consumers as a whole, some have a higher willingness to
pay for an item than the market price; however they only pay the
market price.370 The welfare to consumers from the market is the
aggregated differences between what they were willing to pay and
the price actually paid. 371 For producers, they sell all units at the
market price and reap aggregated differences between what it would
cost to produce each unit and the revenue they receive -the market
price. 2 In other words, profit. When a producer, say a monopolist,
has market power, they are able to restrict the quantity sold and increase the price. This means that those consumers who were willing
to pay the "normal" market price but not the monopoly price will no
longer purchase. The welfare attributed to them is lost. The same
principle applies to the producer.
However, the distribution of the benefits of a market is a separate consideration from the welfare created by market structure. In
addition to decreasing total welfare market power, also has the effect
of redistributing a portion of the consumers' welfare to the producer.
This is intuitive in that the producer, in raising price above the competitive price, is taking as profit the difference between some consumers' willingness to pay and the market price.
The exercise of market power thus typically has the following
results in the parallel trade context. If the parallel trade can be
stopped, the supplier in the source country can restrict the quantity
available in the market and raise the market price. As compared to
allowing parallel trade this will have the effect of: (1) increasing the
369. See generally, PAUL MILOPjM AND JouN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 294-98 (1992).

370. See generally,TIRoLE, supra note 366, at 7-9 (explaining concepts).
371. Id. This is generally known as consumer surplus.
372.

Id. This is generally known as producer surplus.
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market price in the destination country, (2) decreasing the total welfare created by the market and (3) transferring a share of the total
welfare created by the market from consumers to producers. While
the last effect may be the most unsettling to consumers in the relevant market, it is the second which is the strongest economic result:
ordinarily the exercise of market power will decrease the total welfare generated by the presence of a market.
C. Theories ofParallelImports
Several different theories have been advanced to explain the international price differentials that give rise to parallel trade.373
1. Free Riding
Particularly in the trademark context, it is argued that parallel
trade is caused by gray marketers free-riding on the marketing and
promotional investments of the authorized seller in the destination
country. 374 This rationale is perhaps most appropriate for goods
which are differentiated primarily on the basis of brand name.375
However, the rationale does not perfectly explain the observed pattern of parallel trade. Were parallel traders free-riding on the promotion of retailers, one would expect to see parallel trade in both directions.3 76 That is, a parallel trader could purchase from a wholesaler in any country then import into another and free ride on the retailer's promotion in that country.377 However parallel trade is generally observed flowing from relatively poor countries to relatively
wealthy ones.378
373. Many of these may contribute to price differential at one time; they are not mutually
exclusive.

374. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F.Supp. 1163, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see
also Brief for Respondents, K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) (citing sources).

375. See Parfums Givenchey, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994)
(perfume); Disensos Artisticos E Industriales, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 97 F.3d 377
(9th Cir. 1996) (Lladro figurines (copyright claim)); Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash,
878 F.2d 659 (3d Cr. 1989) (Lladro figurines (trademark claim)).
376. David A. Maleug and Marion Schwartz, ParallelImports, Demand Dispersion, and
InternationalPriceDiscrimination,37 J. INL. EcoN. 167, 173 (1994). However, the absence
of such bilateral parallel trade can also be explained by differential promotional investments

across countries. Id.
377. Id.
378. See, e.g., Merck v. Primecrown, case C 267-268/95, [1997] 1 C.M.L.R. 83 (1996)
(Spain and Portugal to Britain); Grupo Gamesa S.A. De C.V. v. Dulceria El Molino, Inc., 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13193 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (Mexico to United States); L'Anza Research Int'l.,
Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996), petitionfor cert.filed, 65
U.S.L.W. 3650, (U.S. Mar. 25, 1997) (No. 96-1470) (Malta to United States).
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It should not be forgotten that parallel trade is a shifting of demand from the destination country to the source country. If the same
entity is selling the product in both countries then they are still reaping the full benefits of their promotional investments but through
sales in a country other than where the promotional efforts may be
taking place.
2. Price Discriminating Producer With Market Power
Yet another explanation for the conditions which support parallel trade is a producer with sufficient market power in the destination
market to chose the market price at which their goods will be sold in
the destination country.379 A frequent source of such market power
are the exclusive rights given under patent and copyright laws.3 80 If
the goods are highly differentiated, trademark protection may have a
similar effect. 381 The ability to maintain separate prices in separate
markets is, of course, contingent on the ability to block transnational
arbitrage in the good.
A profit maximizing producer with the ability to set price and
quantity in a market will set price in response to demand conditions.
In each market, the producer can examine the demand schedule and
make a profit maximizing price-quantity decision. This optimal
pricing implies that more should be charged in markets with lower
elasticities of demand. 382 That is, when demand is relatively insensitive to changes in price, higher prices should be charged. Intuitively,
this explains some of the pattern of parallel trade. Wealthy countries
are likely to be price insensitive relative to poorer countries. This
would suggest higher prices in wealthy countries and the ability to
parallel import goods from the relatively poorer countries into the
richer ones and reap the arbitrage profit. This intuition has been confirmed in some contexts, 383 and there is evidence that monopoly price
discrimination contributes to the conditions supporting parallel
trade.384
379. Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 172-75.
380. See, e.g., United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc, 504 U.S. 451, 479 (1992 ("The Court has held many

times that power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright,
or business acumen ... 2).
381. Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 173.
382. TtRoLE, supra note 366,.at 137.
383. F.T. Schut and P.A.G. Van Bergeijk, InternationalPriceDiscrimination:The PharmaceuticalIndustry, 14 WORLD DEvELoPMENT 1141 (1986).

384. See Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 172-75 (citing sources); see also TIROLE,
supra note 366, at 137 ("This rule explains why.., the prices of goods in different countries
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Unless proscribed, parallel trading will eliminate the ability to
set different prices in different markets. The parallel trader will undercut the price of the authorized seller in the destination country and
can continue to profitably do so until the cost of acquisition plus
transportation to the destination country is reached. Faced with the
prospect of having to charge a uniform price in each market -to
preempt the parallel trade - the producer may chose not to sell in
the market with high elasticity of demand (source) at all. 85 The reason is that a price low enough to sell a practical quantity in the source
market may constitute such a reduction in profitability in the destination market - where consumers are relatively, insensitive to price
change - that it is not worth giving up the profit in the destination
market to gain the profit in the source market. 86 This foreclosure has
serious effects on welfare387 which bear on the desirability of allowing parallel trade.
3. Incomplete Pass-through of Currency Fluctuation
Fluctuations in the prices of currencies may give rise to the conditions for parallel trade.388 When the exchange rate of the destination country appreciates, import prices denominated in the destination currency may not be reduced commensurately. This allows the
one to purchase the same good at different (real) prices in different
markets and these are the conditions for parallel trade.389 While the

U.S. currency fluctuated significantly during the 1980s, a period of
significant parallel trading litigation in the United States, 391 there is a
long history of parallel trading among EU nations3 91 during the period
in which the European Monetary System was in force, a primary goal
of which was to stabilize prices.

sometimes do not reflect transportation costs and import taxes .....
385.

See Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 168-72 (citing sources); see also TIROLE,

supranote 366 at 139.
386.

See generally Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Ex-

ception to Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INL Bus. L. 373.
387. See supra Part IV.B.
388. See Christopher A. Mohr, comment, Gray Market Goods and Copyright Law: An
End Run Around K-Mart v. Cartier,45 Cath. L.Rev. 561 at n. 2 & 107 (citing references and
alleging weight of authority suggests currency fluctuations caused parallel trade); But cf
Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 173-74 (recognizing incomplete pass-through of currency
fluctuations as possible cause but finding evidence inconclusive).
389. See Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 173.
390. Id. at 173-74.
391. See infra Part III.

